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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the Trial Court correct when it ordered Summit 
County to effectuate the removal of the Utelite facility where 
undisputed and admitted material facts proved as a matter of law 
that Summit County's decision to allow Utelite to place and 
operate a loading facility in a rural residential zone violated 
the Summit County Development Code and Utah statutes? 
Standard of Review: Issue of law--correctness. Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996). 
Preservation of issue: See Appellants' Preservation of 
Issue No. 1, Appellants' Brief at 1. 
2. Was the Trial Court's Order to remove the facility 
allowed under the Summit County Development Code and Utah law? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: Same as Issue 
No. 1 above. 
3. Was the Trial Court correct in determining that Summit 
County violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act when the 
undisputed facts established that there was no notice for the 
Planning Commission Meeting at which approval was given to 
Utelite to move to Echo? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: Same as issue 
1 above. 
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4. Was the Trial Court correct in determining that Summit 
County violated plaintiffs' due process rights when there was no 
notice for the Planning Commission Meeting at which approval was 
given to Utelite to move to Echo? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: Same as issue 
1 above. 
5. Was the trial court correct when it denied plaintiffs' 
request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988? 
Standard of review: A trial court's conclusions of law are 
reviewed on appeal for correctness. Sanders v. Sharp, 886 
P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
Preservation of Issue: See Order re: Award of Plaintiffs' 
Attorney's Fees, (R. 2322). 
6. Was the Union Pacific Railroad a necessary and 
indispensable party to this action when it was not required to be 
a party for the Court to enforce the Summit County Development 
Code and Utah zoning law. 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: See 
Appellants' Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue No. 
6, Appellants' Brief at 2. 
7. Did the trial court correctly determine that a claim of 
nuisance per se can be based on a prohibited use under zoning 
laws? 
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: See 
Appellants' Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue No. 
2 
6, Appellants7 Brief at 2. 
8. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
prohibiting discovery against Summit County although there were 
claims remaining against it, Summit County was participating in 
discovery, and was still a party after the Court entered its 
order for partial summary judgment? 
Standard of review: A trial court's decision to limit 
discovery is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. 
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 669 F.2d 620, 
623 (10th Cir. 1982) (construing Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summit County's Motion for Protective Order (R. 725); 
Protective Order (R. 775). 
9. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying 
the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint 
when a trial date had not been set and the amendment sought to 
conform to evidence fully discovered and sought to clarify claims 
already made? 
Standard of review: The trial court's determination of a 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint is reviewed on 
appeal for abuse of discretion. Westlev v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs' Motion to File Third 
Amended Complaint and Supporting Memorandum (R. 779); 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (R. 911, 918), and 
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Order Denying Motion to Amend and Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R. 1024). 
10. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when 
it granted motions in limine precluding the plaintiffs from 
introducing evidence that the Utelite facility was built directly 
upon a public road and affected access of the plaintiff Richins 
and the Dicker Hill Trust? 
Standard of review: A trial court's decision to admit or 
preclude evidence is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Rena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Utelite's Motion in Limine, (R. 1488); Order re: Motions 
in Limine and Discovery Motion (R. 1762). 
11. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in 
permitting the jury to view the Utelite site purportedly on the 
basis that the plaintiffs were seeking present and future damages 
when it limited the damages to those incurred only to the date of 
trial and when such a view was prejudicial and did not 
demonstrate the normal operation of the Utelite facility? 
Standard of review: A trial court's decision to allow a 
jury to view a specific site is reviewed on appeal for abuse 
of discretion. State v. Carbututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1993) . 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs' Opposition to Utelite's 
Motion for Jury View (R. 1460); Objection at Trial (R. 
2663) . 
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12. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
adopting clearly erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of 
law that purport to establish the Utelite facility as presently 
operating is not a nuisance. 
Standard of review: The trial court's conclusions of law 
are reviewed on appeal for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 
886 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). A trial court's findings 
of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs' Objection to Utelite' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: 
Equitable Relief (R. 2198). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 3 Development Code of 
Summit County 
Appendix 14 Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-
27-6.5, et seq. 
(1987) 
Appendix 15 Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1, 
et sea. (1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/appellees ("plaintiffs") brought this case to 
remove Utelite's loading facility which was illegally placed near 
their homes and businesses. (R. 7-8). Summit County and Utelite 
were named as defendants because: (1) the Summit County Planning 
Commission decided in a planning commission meeting, without any 
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notice to the plaintiffs or the public, that the loading facility 
could locate in Echo as a "permitted" use in a neighborhood zoned 
rural residential (R. 2) ; and, (2) Utelite applied for and Summit 
County issued a building permit for the facility more than six 
months after it was built and was operating without having a 
certificate of zoning compliance. (R. 3) 
Because these actions directly violated the law, the 
plaintiffs primarily sought and continue to seek the remedy of 
removal of the facility under the Summit County Development Code 
("Development Code") and Utah statutes. (R. 282-83; 313). 
Secondarily, the plaintiffs sought and continue to seek damages 
for the harm suffered as a result of the illegal placement of the 
facility. (R. 312, 317-318) 
In this appeal, the plaintiffs request the affirmance of the 
Trial Court's determination that Summit County effectuate the 
removal of the facility in accordance with the Development Code 
and Utah zoning law. Should the Court order a new trial, 
plaintiffs also request the Court permit them to seek damages and 
further equitable relief. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action was originally commenced on July 31, 1990, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the acts and 
omissions of Summit County ("County") allowing the Utelite 
Corporation ("Utelite") to build a new loading facility and to 
operate next to the plaintiffs homes, businesses and farms 
violated the Development Code §§ 1.9, 1.15, 1.16, 12.7, 12.20; 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-7, 18 and 23; Utah's Open and Public 
Meetings Act, §§ 52-4-1, et seq.; and due process guarantees, 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7, U.S. Const., amend. XIV. (R. 1-14). The 
plaintiffs sought to have the decision by Defendant Summit County 
locating the facility to be declared null and void, sought to 
have the facility removed and sought an award of costs and 
attorney's fees. (R. 7-8). 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was amended to name the Utelite 
Corporation as a Defendant on November 2, 1990. (R. 78-79). 
Utelite filed a lengthy Answer and responded to written 
discovery. (R. 95; A. 1). The following material facts were 
established by the pleadings and official documents of the 
County: 
(1) Utelite received verbal permission from the 
Planning Commission in a Planning Commission meeting to 
move its facility to Echo (A. 1 at No. 14); 
(2) Utelite received a letter from the Chairman of the 
Planning Commission to confirm the discussion at the 
Planning Commission Meeting that it was the consensus of 
the Commission that the Utelite operation "presently" 
set-up in Wanship, Utah could move to Echo and would be 
considered a "permitted" use (R. 9, 35, para. 2, 97, 
355); 
(3) There had not been notice to the public, or the 
plaintiffs that there would be a discussion concerning 
the location of the Utelite facility at the Planning 
Commission meeting. (R. 10, 35, para. 3, 97, 129); 
(4) The minutes from the Planning Commission meeting 
contained no reference to a discussion of the proposed 
location of the Utelite facility (R. 11-13, 35, para. 4, 
124-127) . 
(5) Utelite had applied for, and the County granted, a 
building permit six months after the facility had been 
built and was operating (R. 14, 36, para. 7, 98); 
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(6) The building permit approved the use/structure as a 
"permitted" use in an "AG-1" zone.1 (R. 36, para. 7, 
130) ; 
(7) The specific site occupied by the Utelite facility 
was not used as a loading facility for more than one 
year prior to the erection of the facility. (R. 98, 
para. 9). 
(8) The activities of the Utelite loading facility are 
neither permitted nor conditional uses under Chapter 12.20 
of the Summit County Development Code within an RR-2 or AG-1 
zone. (R. 37, para. 10). 
There was no genuine issue as to these material facts. The 
plaintiffs, therefore, filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P. (R. 104). This Motion also 
relied upon specific provisions of the adopted Development Code 
which are not in dispute and which were adopted pursuant to Utah 
law. Utah Code Ann. §§17-27-7, 7.10, and 8 (1987) (R. 106-117). 
Under the Development Code, the area in which the facility 
was located was and continues to be zoned as RR-2 ("rural 
residential"). (R. 36, para. 9). There was no provision that 
identified a loading facility like this as a "permitted" use. 
Development Code at 12.7; 12.20. Since the use was not 
permitted, the decision allowing the placement of the facility 
and the building permit was "null and void" under the Code. 
Development Code at 1.15. Removal was, therefore, expressly 
1
 The County has admitted that pursuant to Chapter 12.7 of 
the Development Code, the area occupied by the Utelite facility 
is zoned "RR-2." (R. at 37, para. 10). However, Utelite's 
October 1989 building permit application indicates under the 
heading "Zoning Approval" that the area is zoned "AG-1." (A. 2). 
Regardless of whether the area occupied by the facility was zoned 
AG-1 or RR-2, the applicable zoning ordinances make it clear that 
the facility is neither a permitted nor a conditional use in 
these zones. Development Code at 12.20. (A. 3). 
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authorized. Development Code at 1.16; Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23 
(1987) . 
As a separate and independent basis for their claims, the 
plaintiffs based their Motion for Summary Judgment upon Utah's 
Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1, et seq. 
(1953, as amended); (R. 114-16). Under this Act, actions taken 
in public meetings without notice are voidable. Utah Code Ann. § 
52-4-8 (1953, as amended). 
In addition, the plaintiffs sought removal because their due 
process rights had been violated. (R. 5, 116). A zoning 
decision made without notice violates due process. Utah Const, 
art. I, § 7; U.S. Const., amend. XIV. 
The Trial Court, Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding, granted 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and awarded the relief 
requiring Summit County to effectuate the removal of the 
facility. The Trial Court also granted a stay of this relief for 
60 days to permit Summit County to appeal.2 (A. 4, "Order"). 
Summit County petitioned for an interlocutory appeal from 
the Order for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 2 84). The Supreme 
2
 In their opening brief the appellants note that the 
plaintiffs timely lodged Proposed Findings and an Order to which 
objections were made and heard on October 15, 1991. The 
appellants neglect to point out that new Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions were then sent to the Trial Court after objections 
were heard but for some inexplicable reason were never filed. (R. 
at 597) Changes as to the law on the finality of Orders 
occurred, and lengthy negotiations then took place as to the form 
of the Order. (Id.) The matter then came before the Court on a 
Order to Show Cause hearing scheduled by computer and after a 
full consultation with the Trial Court, the Order for the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment was executed. Id. 
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Court considered the Petition and denied it on October 27, 1993. 
(A. 5). 
Plaintiffs then asked the Trial Court, Judge David Young, to 
remove the facility in accordance with the prior Order. Judge 
Young indicated plaintiffs would need to file an Order to Show 
Cause to seek enforcement of the prior Order. Judge Young 
further indicated that plaintiffs could amend their complaint to 
allow for their damage claims to be heard so that all claims 
would be resolved. (R. 3 03). 
The plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 11, 1994. 
(R. 304). In the amended complaint the plaintiffs did not alter 
the allegations that had already been made and ruled upon. The 
only new claims arose from dust and noise, encumbrance of the 
water system that serves plaintiffs' homes, and interference with 
the comfortable enjoyment of plaintiffs' property caused by the 
facility. Plaintiffs specifically added damage claims for 
nuisance, statutory nuisance, trespass, negligence, and 
infliction of emotional distress. (R. 311-319). The plaintiffs 
also pleaded for their attorneys fees against Summit County 
specifically under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (R. 317-319). 
On April 14, 1994, the plaintiffs formally requested the 
Trial Court issue an Order to Show Cause why the County should 
not be required to effectuate removal of the facility as required 
by the previous Order. (R. 400-407). Although Judge Wilkinson 
had heard the matter, ordered the facility removed, and denied 
objections to his Order, and the Utah Supreme Court had denied 
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the County's interlocutory appeal, Judge Young (signed by Judge 
Iwasaki) entered an Order stating "implementation of the Order to 
Show Cause is hereby stayed pending a final resolution of all 
remaining claims against all parties."3 (R. 599). 
An expedited formal and informal discovery schedule on the 
damage claims then took place. Utelite served written discovery 
and Summit County and Utelite both participated in depositions of 
the plaintiffs. Among other things, this discovery focused upon 
a claim by plaintiff Richins and the Dicker Hill Trust (a family 
trust holding title to the Richins' family farm) that the 
facility was built upon a public road and restricted access to 
the farm. (R. 834-836). When the plaintiffs sought to undertake 
written discovery against the County, however, the Trial Court, 
Judge Glen Iwasaki, granted the County's Motion for Protective 
Order purportedly on the basis that the substantive claims 
against Summit County had been resolved. (R. 609-702, 775-76). 
At the conclusion of the expedited discovery schedule, the 
plaintiffs sought to add two additional claims that were fully 
discovered by the defendants and that arose out of the same 
operative facts as the pending claims. (R. 779-780). First, 
plaintiffs alleged that the Utelite facility was located on a 
public road and encroached upon a court-ordered easement 
3
 In their brief the defendants comment upon the system of 
rotating judges. (Defendants' brief at 4). The reality of this 
case is that the defendants were the prime beneficiaries of the 
rotating judges because they urged Judge Young to not follow 
Judge Wilkinson's Order of removal, and Judge Young did not do 
so. 
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established in a prior condemnation case. Second, plaintiffs 
alleged that by allowing Utelite to locate its facility on the 
public road, the County had unlawfully abandoned the road in 
violation of Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102. (R. 805-
806). Although a final pretrial date and trial date had not been 
established, the Trial Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian 
presiding, denied leave to amend. (R. 1018-1019) . 
Before the trial, Utelite moved for summary judgment 
asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs' claim for infliction of 
emotional distress had not been sufficiently pleaded and that 
plaintiffs had failed to elicit evidence of conduct that was 
sufficiently outrageous for emotional distress. (R. 1218-1219). 
Utelite also filed extensive motions in limine. (R. 1208-1222). 
The plaintiffs vigorously disputed Utelite's motions on 
summary judgment and through deposition introduced facts in 
opposition to the Motion as support for their claim. (R. 1427-
45). The Trial Court granted the Motion on the basis that there 
existed no genuine issues of material issues of fact with respect 
to the alleged "outrageousness" of Utelite's conduct. (R. 1766-
68; A. 6) . 
The Trial Court also granted two of Utelite's Motions in 
Limine. It prohibited the introduction of evidence on the 
facility's blocking access to the Richins property and prohibited 
evidence about the plaintiffs worries of the impact of the 
Utelite facility on the town of Echo's water supply. (R. 1764). 
The remaining claims came on for trial before Judge Frank G. 
12 
Noel on September 12, 1995. At the time of trial, Judge Noel 
ruled that Judge Wilkinson's previous Order for Partial Summary 
Judgment was the law of the case and that the defendants had not 
shown the facility was an accessory to a non-conforming use. (R. 
23 70). Since the use was prohibited, Judge Noel found that the 
nature of the facility, a rock aggregate loading operation, and 
the noise, dust and other conditions attendant to it, constituted 
a nuisance per se in this rural residential neighborhood. (R. 
2371). 
By stipulation of the parties, and to expedite the trial, 
the Trial Court dismissed all other remaining claims without 
prejudice and Utelite waived its right to assert a statute of 
limitations bar with respect to any such claim.4 (R. 2098) . 
Trial proceeded on the damage issues. During the trial the 
Court advised the jury that there was an order to remove the 
facility (R. 1985), that had been stayed pending appeal. (R. 
1985). The Special Verdict allowed damages to be awarded only 
until the day of trial. (A. 8, para. 2). The Court also 
permitted the jury to view the facility while operating, over the 
plaintiffs' objection that such a view was prejudicial, was not 
"evidence" or reflective of the actual condition of the site in 
the past or at the time of trial. (R. 2663-2666). 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury found the facility 
had been the proximate cause of damages to plaintiffs until the 
4
 Should this case be reversed, plaintiffs will bring all of 
their claims. 
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day of trial. (A. 8). It awarded damages to the plaintiffs in 
the following amounts: Jane Harper, $5,000.00; Richard Harper, 
$5,000.00; Frank Cattelan, $3000.00 and Richard Richins and the 
Dicker Hill Trust, $1500. 00.5 
At Utelite's request, the Court allowed some evidence on 
"further" equitable relief. Because of the rulings on the 
Motions in Limine, however, plaintiffs could not introduce all of 
the evidence that would support additional equitable relief, 
including the evidence that the facility blocked access and was 
on a public road. In addition, Judge Noel heard no evidence as 
to illegal procedures followed by Utelite and the County to 
locate the facility. 
The Trial Court did not grant any further equitable relief 
except for the equitable relief to which the plaintiffs were 
entitled under the terms of Judge Wilkinson's Order. (R. 2101-
2102; 2336, A. 8, para. 6, A. 9, para. 4). The Trial Court 
awarded some but not all of the plaintiffs' attorneys fees and 
costs under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act but not 
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988. (A. 10; R. 
2322-2323). 
5
 The appellants claim these awarded amount are "nominal." 
They fail to mention that the jury was expressly advised it could 
not award future damages and that there was an Order to remove 
the facility. It was not surprising the jury awarded these 
amounts in light of these instructions, and should the facility 
be removed, these "nominal" amounts will not limit Utelite's 
economic ability to move to another site. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this action are owners of property in 
Echo, Utah. (R. 23 74). Richard and Jane Harper obtained a 
certificate of zoning compliance from Summit County as 
prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit for their home. 
(R. 2381-83). A building permit was secured in 1987 (Trial Exh. 
4) that properly identified the area as rural residential, and 
they built their home at that time in reliance thereon. (R. 
2383-84). 
Frank Cattelan, 68, has lived in Echo since August 28, 1947, 
and has owned property since 1954. (R. 2544-45). Mr. Cattelan 
operates a small cafe in Echo and serves as the President of the 
Echo Mutual Water Company, which provides the town with culinary 
water (R. 2544, 2548). 
Plaintiff Rich Richins, 62, was born in Echo and purchased 
his family farm from his father in 1971. (R. 2663, 2670) . Mr. 
Richins is the president of the Echo Ditch Company, an irrigation 
company formed to distribute irrigation water to land owners 
about and including Echo. (R. 2679). The primary access to Mr. 
Richins farm is on the road upon which the Utelite facility was 
built. (R. 2672-73). Mr. Richins and his family were provided 
court-ordered access to this class B road in 1971. (R. 945, 
954) . 
In 1988, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, Utelite began to 
prepare to construct a railroad loadout facility on a road near 
the railroad line running through Echo. (A. 1 at No. 16; Sept. 
15 
10, 1988, letter written by Doug Burton, the surveyor; R. 2876) . 
The road had been travelled by the public for more than 10 years. 
Utelite did so because the Union Pacific Railroad expressed a 
desire to close the track from Echo to Park City, and there was a 
passing track in Echo, which was occasionally used to temporarily 
keep broken down railroad cars on a short term basis. (R. 24 84; 
2817; 2838). Utelite accepted cash, and received a discount on 
its freight charges from the railroad for the move. (R. 2839). 
Although other sites were available it chose Echo for economic 
reasons. (R. 2885-90). 
There had never been commercial loading facilities on this 
track or anywhere else in Echo before this time. (R. 23 81, 
2796). The last time any loading had been done in Echo was 
decades earlier when the railroad loaded the last coal fired 
train engine that went through the town. (R. 2552; 2615-2616; 
2795) . 
Utelite had been loading its rock product in Wanship, Utah 
before its move. It used a temporary conveyor for its operation 
which was substantially smaller than the one in Echo. (R. 2884) . 
Some of the attributes of the facility at which it operated are 
compared to the facility in Echo in the following chart: 
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Wanship Echo 
Location Portable Fixed 
Area 10,000 sq. ft. 50,000 sq. ft. 
Hopper <15 tons >40 tons 
Cars loaded 386 from 1983-88 >300 per yr. 
Bag House No Yes 
(R. 2884/ 2560-61; 2884-88). 
On November 1, 1988, Utelite contacted Jerry Smith, an 
employee of the Summit County Planning Commission, to see what 
was required to construct the new facility.6 (A. 1 at No. 33) . 
At Mr. Smiths request, Utelite went before the Summit County 
Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of the 
facility in Echo. (A. 1 at No. 7 & 33) . 
The proposed agenda f or the December 13, 1988 meeting of the 
planning Commission provided no notice to the public that there 
would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation and 
construction of the Utelite facility. (R. 97; 129, A. 11, 12). 
The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning 
Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any testimony 
concerning the proposed relocation and construction of the 
Utelite facility. (R. 124-127, A. 12). 
6
 Before the facility was moved, Utelite also contacted the 
Summit County Attorney in his "private practice" to assist 
Utelite in negotiating with the railroad. Additionally, the 
County Attorney represented Utelite in his "private practice" 
when it was cited for not having an air quality permit for the 
Echo facility. (R. 2908-2909). 
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Despite the lack of notice, and lack of discussion about the 
facility in the minutes, Utelite received verbal permission at 
the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin 
construction of the facility. (A. 1 at No. 14). 
On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert 
McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to 
Utelite confirming the discussion at the December 13, 1988 
meeting of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed 
relocation of the Utelite facility. (R. 9, 97; 123, A. 13; A. 1 
at Nos. 14 & 33). 
This letter indicated that it was the consensus of the 
Planning Commission that the Utelite operation presently set up 
in Wanship could be moved to the Echo location and would be 
considered a "permitted use" at the Echo site. (R. 123, A. 13; 
A. 1 at Nos. 14 & 33). 
Utelite began constructing the facility without a building 
permit on or about February 21, 1989. (R. 97; 356; A. 1 at No. 
2) . 
The facility was substantially completed by April 25, 1989, 
at which time the first loading of railroad cars took place. (A. 
1 at No. 2; R. 97). 
In October 1989, six months after the facility was built, 
Utelite made application for a building permit from Summit 
County, which permit was issued on November 28, 1989 as building 
permit # 89291 for the construction of the loadout facility in 
Echo. (R. 97; 356; 2879; A. 2). 
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This application states that the facility is located within 
an "AG-1" zone and that the use/structure is a "permitted use." 
(R. 130, A. 2). At the time, the area in which the Utelite 
facility was built was zoned "RR-2" under chapter 12.7 of the 
Summit County Development Code. (A. 3 at 12.7). The Development 
Code required a building permit before the construction of any 
building or structure. Development Code at 1.9. (A. 3). A 
prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit was a 
certificate of zoning compliance. Development Code at 1.9. 
The activities conducted by Utelite were not listed as 
"permitted" uses within an "RR-2" area in the Development Code.7 
Development Code at 12.20. Also, the activities of the Utelite 
facility were not a permitted nor a conditional use within an 
"AG-1" zone under the provisions the Development Code. 
Development Code at 12.20. Thus, the Utelite facility is a 
prohibited use. (R. 2370-71). 
The site occupied by Utelite had not been used as a loading 
facility for more than one year prior to the erection of 
Utelite's facility. (R. 98). 
As soon as Utelite began operating there developed many 
problems. (R. 2387-2411). The operation was dusty and noisy. 
(.Id.). Large, uncovered tractor trailers hauling the Utelite 
7
 A permitted use is one "for which no conditional use 
permit is required." Development Code at 1-6(53). Conditional 
uses are ones that would be improper under general conditions in 
the place of use. Development Code at 6.1. To obtain a 
conditional use permit, there must be notice and public hearing. 
Id. 
19 
product would go through town and park in front of the 
plaintiff's residence. (R. 2386, 2389). Rail cars were stored 
at the facility. (R. 2389) . Utelite workers would bang the rail 
cars creating noise and dust. (R. 2388). When they cleaned the 
railcars, aggregate falls between the tracks. (R. 2675). A huge 
floodlight at the facility would illuminate the yard and home of 
the Harpers. (R. 2389). The facility would operate at night and 
on weekends. (R. 2391). 
When it began to operate, Utelite did not keep the area 
clean, or bother to get a air quality permit although one was 
required. (R. 2897-2912). On June 1, 1989 the Division of Air 
Quality sent a letter to Utelite indicating that it was not 
supposed to operate without a permit. (R. 2907-2908). Utelite 
did not obtain an air quality permit until six or eight months 
after the facility began its operations. (R. 2987-2912). 
Utelite aggregate contains approximately sixty percent 
silica. (R. 2880-81). Utelite requires its own employees to 
wear respirators in dusty areas, and the material is known to 
irritate the respiratory system, the eyes, and the skin. (R. 
2881-82). During the load-out process, Utelite dust is left on 
the tracks. (R. 2910). The light-weight aggregate is easily 
airborne, blows over the railroad tracks as high as the railroad 
cars, and blows over the premises. (R. 2910-11). Mrs. Harper 
and her children cough, sneeze, and have watering eyes because of 
the aggregate dust. (R. 2390). It blows on their home. (R. 
2394-2398) . Pictures were taken just two weeks before trial 
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showing "Utelite" on the children's window sills. (R. 2386). 
Just before trial, samples were taken from Mrs. Harper's windows 
that were made up of "Utelite." (R. 2775-2780). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court properly entered summary judgment requiring 
removal of the facility from Echo, Utah. There were no genuine 
issues of material fact and the plaintiffs were entitled to 
removal because the County, without notice, allowed the facility 
to locate in a rural residential zone without a building permit 
or certificate of zoning compliance. This violated the 
Development Code, Utah zoning law, Utah's laws on open and public 
meetings and due process guarantees. 
The County has already attempted to appeal this Order to the 
Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal and lost. The 
Appellants have not given any more reason in their brief to 
reverse the Trial Court than they gave the Supreme Court on the 
fundamental issue of removal. There were no disputes of fact on 
this issue, all indispensable parties were before the Trial 
Court, and the relevant zoning laws, including the County's 
Development Code, completely supported the Trial Court's 
decision. 
The Trial Court, however, did commit error during the 
damage phase of this case by 1) refusing to allow plaintiffs to 
conduct discovery, 2) by denying leave to amend plaintiffs' 
claims to assert ones that provided additional basis for damages, 
3) by limiting evidence the plaintiffs could introduce, and 4) by 
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allowing the jury to view the facility during atypical operating 
conditions. All of these errors unfairly prejudiced the 
plaintiffs, reduced the amount of the jury's award, and led to 
the Trial Court's erroneous findings and conclusions on further 
equitable relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT THE UTELITE 
FACILITY BE REMOVED WHERE THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF 
DISPUTED FACT 
The Trial Court's Order to remove the facility is based upon 
undisputed facts and well established Utah law. The facts 
demonstrate the County violated Utah law and its own Development 
Code when it allowed the facility to be a "permitted" use in a 
rural residential zone and when it belatedly issued a building 
permit without obtaining a certificate of zoning compliance. 
Under Utah law and the Development Code, the Trial Court had the 
full authority to issue its Order to the County to remove the 
facility. 
A. Allowing the loading facility to operate in a rural 
residential zone violated Utah and County Law. 
The undisputed facts show that Summit County, acting 
without notice, allowed Utelite to locate its facility in an area 
zoned rural residential as a "permitted" use. A permitted use is 
a use expressly authorized within a particular zone. Development 
Code 12.20. The Development Code lists with great particularity 
those uses that are "permitted" in a residential rural zone and a 
loading facility like Utelite's is not included in the list. 
Development Code, § 12.20. 
22 
The Development Code constitutes the master planning 
document for Summit County. Development Code Chapter 1.8. As 
such, it is binding upon the County. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-7 
(1987). Once such a master plan has been duly enacted by the 
governing authorities, further actions by the governing authority 
must be taken in accordance with that plan to promote the health, 
safety and welfare of the community. It becomes the guiding 
instrument for future development and must be followed. See, 
Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 
(Utah 1967); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 398 P.2d 27 
(Utah 1965) . 
Zoning authorities like the County's Planning Commission are 
strictly bound by the terms and standards of a zoning ordinance. 
They are not at liberty to grant or deny permits in derogation of 
those legislative standards. Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 
440, 444-45 (Utah 1981). 
If there is a zoning violation, the Courts are fully 
authorized to order the zoning law be met. At the time Utelite 
built its facility, Utah law and the Summit County Development 
Code specifically authorized injunctive relief and abatement 
proceedings. Under Utah Law: 
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any county 
zoning, subdivision, or official map ordinance is 
punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The board of 
county commissioners, the county attorney, or any owner 
of real estate within the county in which a violation 
occurs, may, in addition to other remedies provided by 
law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or any 
other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent, 
enjoin, abate, or remove any erection, construction, 
alteration, maintenance, or use in violation of this 
23 
Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23 (1987) . 
Under Summit County's Development Code: 
Any person, firm, or corporation, whether as principle, 
agent, employee, or otherwise, violating or causing the 
violation of any of the provisions of this Code shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable as provided by 
law. The County Attorney, or any owner of real estate 
adversely affected by a violation of this Code, may 
institute injunction, abatement, or any other 
appropriate legal action to prevent, enjoin, abate, or 
remove any erection, construction, alteration, 
maintenance, or use in violation of this Code. 
Development Code at 1.16. 
So clear is the law that there need not be a showing of harm 
for an injunction to issue. In Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 
61 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated: 
Under the statute, a specific showing of 
irreparable injury is therefore not required and the 
pleading thereof in the complaint is mere surplusage. 
Nevertheless, it fairly may be said that under the 
foregoing analysis, a showing that the zoning ordinance 
has been violated is tantamount to a showing of 
irreparable injury (to the public). 
Baxter at 65. In this case the Trial Court properly found that 
the acts and omissions of the defendants were contrary to the 
Development Code. Applying Utah Code Section 17-27-23, the 
Summit County Development section 1.16, and Utah case law, the 
Court correctly ordered that the Utelite facility be removed. 
The defendants do not ever mention that the area was zoned 
rural residential in their Brief. They attempt to transform a 
simple case into a complicated one by arguing that there is a 
fact issue whether Summit County's course of dealings were a 
legislative exercise of zoning power or simply administrative 
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action. Whether the County's conduct was administrative or 
legislative does not matter--the placement of the facility in a 
rural residential zone violated the law, and the Trial Court had 
the full authority to order the County to abide by its own laws. 
Likewise, the defendants mistakenly attempt to avoid 
removal by labeling Union Pacific's railtracks as a 
"nonconforming use" and the facility as an "accessory" to this 
nonconforming use. In their argument, the defendants 
conspicuously disregarded that a "permitted use" is explicit and 
has concrete meaning in zoning law. A "permitted use" is 
specifically authorized--which this one was not.8 
Moreover, even if the facts are disregarded, and the 
Planning Commission's decision that the use was "permitted" is 
overlooked, the defendants' argument is wrong. Summit County's 
Development Code does not allow the loading facility as an 
accessory to a nonconforming use.9 
8
 In their brief the County and Utelite refer to a letter 
written by the County Attorney in February of 1990, which was 
long after the facility had been built, describes the facility as 
an "accessory" to a nonconforming use. This letter does not 
reflect what happened before the planning commission and simply 
is the argument of the County and Utelite. It is not a fact. 
9
 The Appellants elusively cite Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning definition of "non-conforming use" in their Brief instead 
of the County's Development Code. Brief of Appellants at 19 n. 7 
(quoting Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1995) § 
6.01 at 481-82). They must do so because Anderson's definition 
does not address (1) the enlargement of the nonconforming use 
that occurred in this case; and (2) the lapse of more than one 
year since this area had been used for loading. Under the 
Development Code, these two facts alone establish that the 
loading facility is prohibited. Development Code at 3.7. 
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The Code defines a "nonconforming use" as: 
3.7 Nonconforming use of Land 
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this 
code became effective, may be continued, provided that no 
such nonconforming use of land shall in any way be expanded 
or extended either on the same or adjoining property, and 
provided that if such nonconforming use of land, or any 
portion thereof, is abandoned or changed for a period of one 
(1) year or more, any future use of such land shall be in 
conformity with the provisions of this Code.(emphasis 
added). 
Development Code at 3.7. Under this provision the nonconforming 
use of land shall in no way be expanded or extended on the same 
or adjoining property and if the use is abandoned for more than 
one year the future use of such land shall be in conformity with 
the provisions of the code. 
In State v. Holt's Estate, 381 P.2d 724 (Utah 1963), the 
Court interpreted a similar code provision,10 and held that the 
discontinuance of the nonconforming commercial use of property 
that burned down for more than one year proved an effective 
abandonment, and the property was thereafter subject to the new 
residential zoning requirement. Holt' s Estate at 725 (citing 
Morrison v. Home, 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961)). 
In this case the area in which the Utelite facility was 
built had never been the site of a commercial loading facility. 
10
 Bountiful City, Sec. 24-18, subsec. 4 provided: 
One Year Vacancy- A building, structure or portion 
thereof, non-conforming as to use, which is, or 
hereafter becomes vacant, and remains unoccupied for a 
continuous period of one (1) year, shall not thereafter 
be occupied except by a use which conforms to the use 
regulations of the zone in which it is located. 
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No loading of railcars had taken place anywhere in Echo for 
decades when the last steam engine to roll through town was 
loaded with coal for fuel. (R. 2552; 2615-16). There was no 
loading facility in 1987 when plaintiffs Jane Harper obtained 
their building permit for their home in the RR-2 neighborhood. 
Defendants' error is compounded by claiming that the 
facility is an "accessory" to a "preexisting use." Brief of 
Defendants7 at 19-20. An "accessory use" is defined as: 
A subordinate use customarily incidental to and located 
upon the same lot occupied by the main use and devoted 
exclusively to the main use of the premises. 
Development Code at 1.6(63). Loading rock aggregate cannot be 
considered an "accessory" to the non-conforming use of a railroad 
track. Additionally, the use is devoted to loading rock 
aggregate for Utelite' s commercial purposes. This is not an 
"accessory use" to a railroad right-of-way.11 
The defendants' argument, taken to its logical conclusion, 
would mean that any type of loading facility on a railroad would 
be considered an "accessory use." For example, a garbage loading 
facility could be located anywhere along a railroad track that 
runs through a rural residential zone. This is clearly not the 
law. 
Finally, under the Development Code, "[a] non-conforming use 
shall be deemed abandoned if said use has not applied to the 
premises for a consecutive period of 12 months." Development 
11
 The preexisting use to occasionally and temporarily hold 
railcars for repair may have been an "accessory use." A loading 
facility for a private company was not. 
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Code at 3.9. If a nonconforming use is deemed abandoned when not 
exercised on the premises for 12 months, an "accessory" to the 
nonconforming use would surely be abandoned. 
B. Appellants Violated the Development Code By 
Belatedly Issuing a Building Permit Without a 
Certificate Of Zoning Compliance. 
The undisputed facts also demonstrate the County violated 
its own Code because the facility was built without a certificate 
of zoning compliance and long before the issuance of a building 
permit. 
The Summit County Development Code expressly provides that: 
Construction or removal of any building or structure12 
or any part thereof as provided or as restricted in this 
Code shall not be commenced, or proceeded with, except 
after the issuance of a written permit for the same by 
the county building inspector . . . . Prerequisite to 
the issuance of a building permit shall be the obtaining 
of a certificate of zoning compliance from the zoning 
administrator or his authorized representative. 
Development Code Chapter 1.9. The facts of this case leave no 
doubt that this provision was clearly disregarded by the 
Defendants in regards to the construction of the Utelite 
facility. 
Because Summit County's acts were in derogation of the 
Development Code, they are null and void. The Development Code 
at Chapter 1.15 provides that: 
All departments, officials, and public employees of 
Summit County vested with duty and authority to issue 
12
 Chapter 1.6(61) of the Development Code defines structure 
as "[a]nything constructed or erected which requires location on 
the ground or attached to something having location on the 
ground." Utelite's loadout facility is a structure under this 
definition. 
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permits, licenses, or certificates of zoning compliance 
shall conform to the provisions of this Code and shall 
not issue a permit, license, or certificate of zoning 
compliance for use, building or other purposes where the 
same would be in conflict with this Code, and any such 
permit, license, or certificate issued in conflict with 
the provisions of this Code, shall be null and void. 
Development Code at 1.15. The actions of Summit County in 
issuing the building permit were "null and void." The Trial 
Court had full authority to order Summit County to effectuate 
removal of the facility, and its Order must be upheld. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO REMOVE THE FACILITY IS 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH 
LAW 
In their brief the defendants challenge the remedy awarded 
by the Trial Court by maintaining that Judge Wilkinson's 
"confusion" extends to his "articulation of the relief granted." 
Brief of defendants at 30. Judge Wilkinson was not "confused." 
He properly understood this case "boiled down" to a violation of 
the Development Code and zoning laws. (Attached as "A-l" to 
Defendants' Brief at 3, line 24). In his Order, Judge Wilkinson 
indicated that Summit County "shall be required to effectuate the 
removal of Utelite from their currently occupied site." To allow 
Utelite an appeal, Judge Wilkinson stayed the effect of the Order 
for sixty (60) days. Unless the appeal was successful, and it 
was not, the facility had to move. 
There is nothing confusing about this relief, and so far the 
Defendants have been the ones to benefit from the stay. Since 
the appeal, it has been fully understood. For example, Judge 
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Noel advised the jury in this case that there was an Order 
requiring Summit County to remove the facility. (R. at 1985). 
The undisputed facts admitted by the defendants in their 
Answers and in discovery clearly establish a violation of the 
Development Code. The Trial Court fully intended that the 
facility be removed but permitted an appeal. Summit County had 
the opportunity to appeal, and lost. 
At that point in time the facility should have been removed 
and Judge Young erred in failing to implement the removal Order. 
The Order was the law of the case. See Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977). Since the Utah Supreme 
Court would not reverse the Order upon the fervent appeal of the 
County, this Court should not do so at this time. 
In their Brief the defendants challenge the relief 
because it "overlooked the difficult position of Summit County." 
Brief of defendants at 31. Specifically, the defendants indicate 
that Utelite could have a claim of "equitable estoppel" against 
Summit County because the County told Utelite that the facility 
would constitute a "permitted use." Brief of defendants' at 31. 
In making this argument the defendants implicitly 
acknowledge that the Planning Commission erred by indicating the 
"use" was "permitted". The defendants also implicitly 
acknowledge the real reason for these proceedings: the County 
unlawfully allowed Utelite to move to Echo in violation of its 
own law. There is the potential for a claim against the County 
from Utelite. However, that issue is between Utelite and the 
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County. It should not be the plaintiffs' problem. 
So far Utelite has not had to formally make this claim. 
Instead, it has purposely and deliberately accepted the risks of 
staying in Echo. It has done so knowing the zoning in the area 
was rural residential, and knowing there are alternate locations 
to which it could move. (R. 2885-2890). Utelite has chosen to 
do this after the Court ordered removal. 
Instead of complying with the law, Utelite and the County 
have undertaken a joint strategy, beneficial to both, to place 
blame on others, including the plaintiffs (for their alleged 
delay in bringing the action), and the Railroad (for requesting 
Utelite to abandon its Wanship site). 
This blame is misplaced. In Utah, zoning violations are 
tolerated only in "exceptional" cases. Neither the County nor 
Utelite can persuasively argue that there are exceptional 
circumstances here. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that: 
Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not 
constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive relief 
against alleged violations of the zoning laws, unless 
the circumstances are exceptional. Zoning ordinances 
are governmental acts which rest upon the police power, 
and as to violations thereof any inducements, reliances, 
negligence of enforcement, or like factors are merely 
aggravations of the violation rather than excuses or 
justifications thereof. 
Baxter at 65 (quoting Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 
136, 138 (Utah 1976)). In this simple case the law was met. The 
Development Code, Utah statutes and case law all permit removal. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING 
THAT SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS VIOLATED THE OPEN 
MEETINGS LAW WHEN THE COUNTY FAILED TO GIVE 
NOTICE OF THE ACTION TAKEN AT THE PLANNING 
MEETING THAT ALLOWED UTELITE TO LOCATE ITS 
FACILITY IN AN AREA ZONED RR-2 
The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. 
sections 52-4-1, et seq., expressly provides that the actions of 
the state, its agencies and political subdivisions "be taken 
openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-4-1. Each public body must "give not less than 24 
hours public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of each 
of its meeting," Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6(2) and must keep written 
minutes which must include " . . . the substance of all matters 
proposed, discussed, or decided, and a record, by individual 
member, or votes taken and the names of all citizens who appeared 
and the substance in brief of their testimony; . . . " Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-4-7. Any final action taken in violation of these 
provision is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-4-8. 
Furthermore, section 52-4-9 of the Utah Code provides: 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may 
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel 
compliance with or enjoin violations of this chapter or to 
determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a 
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees 
and court costs to a successful plaintiff. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2). 
There is no dispute that the posted agenda for the Planning 
Commission meeting provided no notice to the public that there 
would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation of the 
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Utelite facility and that the minutes of the December 13, 1988 
meeting contain no reference to a discussion concerning the 
proposed relocation of Utelite facility. (R. 97; see R. 129, A. 
11) . 
Being unable to contest this, the defendants argue that the 
decision to allow Utelite to move was a "routine" or 
"operational" one for which notice is not required. Brief of 
defendants at 30. 
There is no support for this argument in the statute. It 
does not make exceptions for "operational" or "routine" 
decisions. It does not make distinctions because they would 
directly contradict the policy of the Open and Public Meetings 
law. The State's expressed policy is to have all of the 
''people's business" conducted openly. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 
(1996). The Act states that a "meeting" means the convening of 
the "public body" when a quorum is present "for the purpose of 
discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body has 
jurisdiction or advisory power." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(1) 
(emphasis added). This certainly applies to the Summit County 
Planning Commission and the decision in this case. 
Moreover, the Act expressly indicates neither chance or 
social meetings can be used to circumvent the Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 52-4-2(1). This provision underscores the importance of a 
broad application. The law expressly disallows the type of 
action the defendants suggest occurred in this case when the 
President of Utelite "dropped into" the Planning Commission 
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Meeting. Brief of defendants at 17. 
Finally, granting Utelite a "permitted use" in a Planning 
Commission Meeting is the type of "final" action requiring 
appropriate notice. With notice, the plaintiffs could have been 
brought into the public process. The Planning Commission would 
have known the area was not zoned for use as a loading facility 
and the plaintiffs7 objections to it. Input from neighbors 
affected by zoning decisions and variances is crucial for the 
zoning process to work legitimately. Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 
20 Utah 2d, 437 P.2d 442, 445 (1968). 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the problems created by 
the appellants' analysis is to examine the suggestion they make 
that "the plaintiffs do not dispute the adequacy of the notice 
for the December 13, 1988, Summit County Planning Commission 
meeting . . . they focus on the level of detail required in the 
agenda for that meeting." Brief of defendants at 29. Of course 
the plaintiffs dispute the adequacy of the notice because it did 
not mention Utelite at. all. In this case it was not a question 
of "level" of detail because there was no detail. 
Defendants also argue that the plaintiffs should be barred 
by the Open and Public Meetings Act statute of limitations. 
However, the facts that the defendants rely upon, such as 
"commencement of construction," and "the first loading of 
railroad cars" were not sufficient to appraise the plaintiffs of 
a cause of action under the Act. 
Under Utah law, where there are exceptional circumstances 
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that would make application of the general rule regarding running 
of statute of limitations irrational or unjust, the statue of 
limitations will be tolled. Warren v. Provo, 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1992); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). See also, 
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) 
(concealment by a party prevents that party from relying on the 
statue of limitations). 
This case presented such exceptional circumstances and the 
Trial Court properly tolled the limitations period. The actions 
of which plaintiffs complain were the Planning Commission's 
failure to provide notice as required by the Utah Code Ann. § 52-
4-6(2) and to keep written minutes in accordance with the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-7. Thus, the very action of 
which the plaintiffs complain also served to conceal the 
violations of the Act. ., It was not until months after an 
investigation of this matter that the Planning Commission's 
actions came to light. Upon discovery of the failure to comply 
with the Act, the plaintiffs sought assistance from their elected 
officials. (R. 2672, 2684). They went to the County Attorney13 
13
 All of the "facts" regarding placement did not come to 
light until discovery. For instance, Plaintiffs sought the 
assistance of the Summit County Attorney to remove the facility 
before they filed suit. (R. at 2644-45). Even though they met 
with him and physically inspected the site with him, they were 
never advised that the Summit County Attorney acted as Utelite's 
private counsel on this matter and had provided legal advise in 
his private practice to Utelite prior to the move. (R. 2685-86). 
Nor did they know the County Attorney, as part of his private 
practice, appeared on behalf of Utelite when it was cited for air 
quality violations arising out of the failure to obtain a permit 
to operate the loading facility. (R. 2908-09). 
35 
and to the County Commission. (Id.). 
When neither one would act, this action, including the Open 
and Public Meetings Act claim was filed. Under these exceptional 
circumstances, the Trial Court correctly held that the statute of 
limitations contained in the open meeting law had not been 
violated due to the equitable tolling doctrine, and that Summit 
County's decision was made in violation of the Act. (R. 280-282; 
A. 4, "Findings"). That decision should be affirmed, together 
with the award of attorney's fees for having to prove the 
application of the Act. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS ARE VOID BECAUSE THE ACTIONS 
DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has always applied notice and due 
process principles to zoning decisions. In Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County, 20 Utah 2d. 310, 437 P.2d 442 (1968), the Utah Supreme 
Court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. 306, 70 S. 
Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) for the following: 
The fundamental requisite of due process of law 
is the opportunity to heard. *** An elementary 
and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is 
notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present objections. *** A notice 
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information *** and it must afford 
reasonable time to those interested to make their 
appearance. 
In Tolman, like here, zoning authorities made zoning decisions 
that affectively allowed a change of use in a neighborhood. 
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Adjoining neighbors were not provided with adequate notice, and 
did not attend the meeting at which approval was granted. They 
subsequently went to the county commission, who did not assist 
them, and were forced to file a court action to have the action 
reversed. The Utah Supreme Court held that the failure to 
provide adequate notice violated due process. 
Similarly, in Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th 
Cir. 1985), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah 
law, held that a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of 
mandatory notice and hearing requirements was void, and property 
owners were therefore entitled to injunctive relief against the 
city. Carter at 256. The Carter Court stated: 
It is the general rule that zoning ordinances are in 
derogation of common law property rights and find their 
authority through the state police power; accordingly, 
municipalities and other political subdivisions must 
scrupulously comply with statutory requirements, 
including notice and hearing, in order to provide due 
process of law. 
Id. at 254 (citing Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1975) . 
This is not a complicated case. The County did not meet the 
notice requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act. Had it 
considered the use "conditional,"14 it would have had to give 
notice under the County's zoning ordinances. Development Code, § 
6.1. Its silent agenda did not meet the rudimentary requirements 
of due process because it did not mention Utelite at all. 
14
 A conditional use, however, is only allowed after notice 
and hearing. 
37 
Without noti ce, the plaintiffs were not provided with the 
"fundamental and elementary" requirements of due process cited in 
Tolman, supra; and were not provided with an opportunity to 
object. The Trial Court properly found that such action violated 
due process and was well within its authority to deem the 
decision to permit Utelite to move to Echo as null and void. 
V, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT GRANT 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER AWARDING COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 AND 1988 
The Trial Court properly held that Summit County violated 
the plaintiffs' rights under the Open and Public Meetings Act, 
and violated plaintiffs' due process rights. Even though it 
correctly found their constitutional rights to due process were 
violated, and those rights are guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, the Trial Court did not award the plaintiffs the 
attorney's fees to which they were entitled under the Civil Right 
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, as amended. 
Section 1988 of Title 42 U.S.C. authorizes an award of 
reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in actions 
enforcing rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A prevailing party is 
one who succeeds in any significant issue in litigation which 
achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing the 
suit. This section is interpreted broadly in favor of such 
awards. See e.g., The People of the State of New York v. 11 
Cornwall Company, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983). 
The Trial Court did not award plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney's fees and costs under section 1988 because it found 
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plaintiffs' original amended complaint did not assert a federal 
claim for due process. This result was in error because the 
original amended complaint carefully set out the conduct engaged 
in by county officials (who were operating under color of state 
law) and alleged plaintiffs' due process rights had been 
violated. Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint, which the 
Trial Court permitted, specifically cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a 
basis for attorney's fees. 
This Court can review the Amended Complaint and Second 
Amended Complaint as a matter of law. There is no need for a new 
trial. Both must be construed liberally. All that was required 
was a short and plain statement showing the pleader was entitled 
to relief. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence 
and Coordination Unit., et al., U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 
L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). 
Since the Amended and Second Amended Complaint alleges a 
violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights and sets out the 
unconstitutional conduct of Summit County, they both are 
sufficient for an attorneys fee award. See e.g.. First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1986) (zoning measures must observe due process). 
"Express reference to conduct as relating to section 1983 is not 
required." International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc., v. Colorado State Fair and Industrial Exposition, 673 P.2d 
368 (Colo. 1983) (cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in Lorenc v. 
Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1990)); L.K. et al. v. Gregg, 425 
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N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1988) (the test is not whether specific words 
are used for a constitutional claim). 
VI. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY WAS NOT A NECESSARY 
AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER THE UTELITE FACILITY WOULD BE REMOVED FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS VIOLATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH 
LAW 
In their opening Brief, Defendants claim that the Union 
Pacific Railroad was an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Appellants' Brief at 33). 
Appellants assert that the plaintiffs alleged "the Railroad could 
not use its right-of-way in Echo to load the goods of rail 
customers such as Utelite." (Id.). The Appellants do not make a 
record cite for this bald allegation and cannot. The reason they 
cannot is that it is Utelite that violated the zoning laws when 
it moved to Echo and began loading its product. 
Additionally, under Rule 19, a person shall only be joined 
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action. In reviewing 
a decision made under Rule 19, the trial court's determination 
must not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. 
Seftel V. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), affd. 
sub nom., Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d. 1127 (Utah 
1990) . 
In this case the complete relief that plaintiffs sought, and 
were awarded, was the removal of Utelite's illegally-placed 
facility and damages. There was no relief sought against the 
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Union Pacific. The Union Pacific did not need to be a party for 
the enforcement of the zoning laws. See e.g., Parish of Jefferson 
v. Bertucci Bros. Construction Co., Inc., 176 So.2d 688, 690 (La. 
App. 1965) (property owner not an indispensable party to enjoin 
tenant's zoning violation). 
The Appellants, glossing over the first part of Rule 19, 
rely upon its second part, which indicates a party shall be 
joined if "he claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action." At no time did the defendants move to join the Union 
Pacific, and it did not ask to intervene so that it could claim 
an interest. Under Utah law, the railroad was not 
"indispensable." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A CLAIM 
OF NUISANCE PER SE CAN BE BASED ON A PROHIBITED USE. 
Defendants assert that Judge Noel erred when he found that 
the Utelite facility constituted a nuisance per se. In reaching 
this result, Judge Noel carefully considered all of the arguments 
the defendants now make, and the cases upon which the defendants 
rely. 
Defendants erroneously argue that the conduct engaged in by 
Utelite was not prohibited by a statute and that a county 
ordinance could not serve as the basis for a nuisance per se 
claim. This whole case arose out of the violation of County and 
the Utelite Corporation of specific zoning provisions that are 
have the force of state statutes. Under the Development Code, §§ 
12.7 and 12.20 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-7, 8 and 23, the 
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loading activities and the conditions arising from them are 
prohibited. Under Utah law the statutes could serve as the basis 
for a nuisance per se claim. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 
657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 
939, 943 (Utah 1990). 
Judge Noel carefully considered the dicta from the cases 
cited by Defendants, including Padien V. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938, 
93 9 (Utah 1976), for the proposition that a zoning ordinance in 
an of itself cannot be the basis for a finding of nuisance per 
se. Padien does not stand for the principle that a zoning 
violation can never be the basis for a nuisance per se claim. 
Rather, all that Padien indicates is that zoning ordinance must 
prohibit the conduct and the plaintiff must suffer an injury 
distinct from members of the public. See Erickson v. Craig 
Construction, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah 1994). This is such a case. 
VIII. DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE CAPPED AND THERE IS 
EVIDENCE THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED FOR FURTHER EQUITABLE 
RELIEF SHOULD THE COURT REVERSE THIS CASE. 
In their brief the defendants claim that the jury award 
and Findings and Conclusions of Law Re: Equitable Relief made by 
Judge Noel cannot be disturbed if there is another trial. There 
is no basis for a retrial on the removal issue because it was 
based upon undisputed fact. If the court reverses because of 
error during the damages phase, however, there were errors that 
must be corrected so that the jury and the court can be given a 
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full picture of the continuing harm suffered.15 
A. The Trial Court Committed Error When It Refused to 
Permit Discovery Against Summit County. 
After the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, 
they attempted to engage in discovery with Summit County. The 
Trial Court granted Summit County's Motion for a protective order 
under Rule 26(c), U.R.C.P., and would not permit any discovery 
against the County purportedly on the basis that all substantive 
claims against the County had been resolved. At the time this 
order was entered, Summit County was still a party and there were 
claims pending against it. 
It was fundamental error to preclude plaintiffs from 
conducting any discovery against Summit County. It precluded 
plaintiffs from the discovery of information and evidence to 
support the removal and damage claims in violation of the broad 
spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure. State ex. rel. Bd. 
Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966) (the purpose 
of discovery is to permit the parties to discover "relevant" 
information). If there is a retrial, the substantive claims will 
be at issue. This court must reverse the Protective Order 
precluding discovery against the County. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it 
Denied Plaintiffs' Motion to File a Third Amended 
Complaint. 
At the conclusion of fact discovery (but before any party 
15
 The plaintiffs are not advocating a retrial. The 
primary relief they seek is removal. Once that occurs, it is 
unlikely the case will go further, because damages will end. 
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had designated experts or the setting of a final pretrial or 
trial) the plaintiffs sought to file a third amended Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P. (R. 179). Plaintiffs sought to 
present two additional claims--one against Summit County and 
another against Utelite. (R. 782). The claim against Summit 
County was for its abandonment of the public road upon which the 
Utelite facility was built. (R. 782-840). The claim against 
Utelite is for its interference with the Richins' right-of-way. 
It is parallel to plaintiffs' nuisance claim. 
In its ruling prohibiting amendment, the Trial Court denied 
plaintiff's Motion on the basis that it arose three days after 
the discovery cutoff, would involve third parties and would delay 
the trial. None of these reasons were sufficient under Rule 15, 
U.R.C.P., to deny the amendment. 
There was no surprise when the claims were made. They had 
been fully discovered by Utelite in written discovery and 
depositions and the claims arose out of the same operative facts 
that were the subject of the action. See e.g., Hague v. Juab 
County Mill and Elevator, 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910) 
(depriving access is the basis of nuisance and interference with 
egress claims). There would have been no delay because Utelite 
and the County conducted discovery on the claims. 
Finally, there was and will be no need to have others, 
including the Union Pacific Railroad, appear as parties. The 
questions do not involve ownership of property. They arise out 
of a well-traveled road by the public and the County accepting 
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funds for maintaining the road. (R. 945). To the extent that 
the Railroad has information that bears on the issue, it can be 
subpoenaed and can appear. 
There was no legitimate reason to foreclose the plaintiffs 
from proceeding with all of their claims. If a retrial occurs, 
the plaintiffs must be entitled to assert them and the trial 
court's order denying leave to amend the third-party complaint 
must be reversed. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Utelite's Motion in 
Limine Precluding Evidence on the Lack of Access. 
The Trial Court erroneously prohibited evidence regarding 
the affect of the Utelite facility on access to plaintiff Richins 
property. The fundamental reason for the trial court's ruling 
was that it had previously declined to allow the plaintiffs to 
amend their complaint. As noted, this was in error. 
Further, lack of access was a basis for the pending nuisance 
claim. Hague v. Juab County Mill and Elevator, 37 Utah 290, 107 
P. 249 (1910). When the trial court limited evidence in this 
respect, it would not permit evidence essential to the nuisance 
claims and damages. Therefore, the Court should reverse the 
motions in limine prohibiting evidence on lack of access, 
especially if it orders a retrial. 
D. The Trial Court Erred When It Allowed the Jury to View 
the Facility. 
The Trial Court, over the strenuous objection of the 
plaintiffs, permitted the Jury to travel to watch the "operation" 
of the Utelite facility. The plaintiffs objected in advance, 
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knowing that the jury view would be more prejudicial than 
probative and therefore not permitted under Rule 47(j) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 2663). See Redd v. Airway 
Motor Coach Lines, 137 P.2d 374, 378-80 (Utah 1943). 
The view, in fact, was not probative and was prejudicial. 
It did not reflect the facility as it had been or was presently 
operating. Utelite prepared for the visit for one to two weeks 
before it occurred. (R. 2640, 2675). It brought in a bobcat to 
pick up the debris and Utelite product which normally accumulates 
on the ground. (Id.). The conditions the jury saw did not 
represent those that typically existed. (R. 2400, 2906-2907) . 
The jury visit lasted less than one hour. (R. 2677). The winds 
that usually blow dust were not present. (.Id.) . 
Simply put, the jury view unfairly portrayed the facility. 
It was more prejudicial than probative of past or current 
conditions. It resulted in the jury placing undue weight on its 
impressions than on the testimony of witnesses. The Trial Court 
committed error by allowing it to occur. Should there be a 
retrial, the court must permit the jury to award damages that are 
not impacted by an unfair representation of the Utelite 
operation. 
E. The Trial Court Committed Error when it Adopted 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Prepared by 
Utelite re: Equitable Relief. 
Months after trial Judge Noel entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Utelite's Counsel Re: Equitable 
Relief. These findings did not accurately represent the evidence 
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that was admitted and purportedly relied, in part, on the jury's 
verdict on damages. Neither the Court or the jury had the 
benefit of all of the facts due to the prior Orders denying leave 
to amend, precluding discovery, limiting evidence on access and 
allowing a view of the facility that was not representative. 
In addition, the Findings and Conclusions did not reflect 
the evidence at trial. The plaintiffs filed detailed objections 
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions. (R. 2201). The key 
areas where the findings and conclusions departed from the facts 
include the findings that the facility was not injurious to the 
plaintiffs and does not adversely affect the plaintiffs use and 
enjoyment of their property. 
As set forth above with specific citations to the record, 
the uncontradicted trial evidence demonstrated that dust 
continues to migrate to the plaintiffs property, that dust 
affects the plaintiffs health and causes them to sneeze and 
cough, and the "improvements" made by Utelite are not implemented 
fences remain open, Utelite is left on the ground to blow, that 
truckers continued to bang on the railroad cars to clean them. 
There will be no need to reverse the Trial Court on these 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law if the Court upholds 
Judge Wilkinson's Order. Should that Order be reversed, then the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law must also be reversed so 
that the Trial Court can hear all of the evidence that supports 
removal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's Order requiring the removal of the 
facility is fully supported by the Development Code and Utah law. 
There were no disputes of fact when that Order was entered. This 
Court should affirm this Ordei: and render an opinion that will 
require the removal of the facility. 
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Addendum A. 1 
Dc, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN. 
RICHARD RICHINS, and 
ETHEL S. RAYMOND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, the SUMMIT 
COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
and UTELITE CORPORATION. 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT UTELITE 
CORPORATION'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION 
Civil No. 10718 
Honorable Pat. B. Brian 
The defendant Utelite Corporation through counsel, 
hereby submits its responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Utelite 
Corporation as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify the individual(s) 
responding to these interrogatories and the relationship to the 
answering party. 
RESPONSE: Carsten N. Mortensen, Vice President, 
General Manager of Utelite Corporation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: With regard to the Utelite 
Facility please state: 
a. The date construction of the Facility began; 
b. The date when the Facility was completed or 
substantially completed; 
c. The purpose for which the Facility was 
constructed; 
d. The date the facility began operations; 
e. The date on which Utelite Corporation 
applied for a building permit; 
f. The date on which Utelite Corporation 
received a building permit; 
g. The fees which were paid in connection with 
the acquisition of the building permit. 
RESPONSE: 
a. Ground breaking was during the last half of 
February, 1989. 
b. Site was substantially completed or useable 
to load cars by April 25, 1989. 
c. The Facility was constructed to load train 
cars with Utelite aggregate for out of area 
shipments. 
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d. The first car was loaded April 25, 1989. 
e. Utelite first applied for a building permit 
on February 28, 1989. 
f. Utelite received a building permit on 
February 28, 1989, Permit No. 89007. 
g. February 28, 1989, Permit No. 89007, cost 
$15.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify the individual(s) 
employed by Utelite Corporation who was or were responsible for 
the acquisition of the building permit. 
RESPONSE: Carsten N. Mortensen. 
Bruce Clark - Electric Contractor. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify the individual(s) 
either employed by Utelite or not employed by Utelite who was 
or were involved in the decision to locate the Utelite Facility 
in Echo City. 
RESPONSE: Bob Barker, U.P.R.R.; Bob Jones, U.P.R.R.; 
Ray Nelson, U.P.R.R.; Ray Allamong, U.P.R.R.; Mike Crouse, 
U.P.R.R.; Bud Britton, U.P.R.R.; and Carsten N. Mortensen, 
Utelite. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: With regard to the 
individual(s) identified in Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5, 
identify each person's duties, responsibilities and/or 
involvement in the decision to move the Utelite Facility to 
Echo . 
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RESPONSE: Bob Barker, local sales representative in 
Salt Lake City; Bob Jones, local track supervisor; Ray Nelson, 
Regional Industrial Development; Ray Allamong was an U.P.R.R. 
employee over contracts; Mike Crouse, unknown; Bud Britton, 
believed to be a rate supervisor. Carsten N. Mortensen, vice 
president and general manager of Utelite Corporation had 
various conversations and negotiations with the above named 
individuals regarding various aspects of the site and loading 
facility. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all persons employed 
by Summit County who were contacted regarding the construction 
of the Utelite facility. 
RESPONSE: Jerry Smith, County Planner; all county 
commissioners; Eric Averett, County Building Inspector; Bob 
Taylor, County Building Inspector; Chris Schultz, 
Administrative Assistant; Frank Anderson, Assistant County 
Attorney; and Bob Adkins, County Attorney, Summit County 
Planning Commission. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: With regard to the persons 
employed by Summit County whom Utelite contacted regarding the 
Utelite Facility, please state: 
a. The name of the person; 
b. The person's title or job description at 
Summit County; and 
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c. The date or dates on which communications of 
any sort were made with the above-identified 
person or persons. 
RESPONSE: Defendant Utelite objects to cms 
interrogatory as being overly broad and burdensome, but 
notwithstanding this objection, responds only as completely as 
such information is available: 
1. Jerry Smith, County Planner, November 1, 
1988, and December 12-15, 1988. 
2. Eric Averett, County Building Inspector, 
February 28, 1989. 
3. Bob Taylor, County Building Inspector, 
October 23, 1989 
4. Chris Schultz, Administrative Assistant, 
April 5, 1989 and October 26, 1989. 
5. Frank Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, 
August 3, 1990. 
6. Bob Adkins, Summit County Attorney, November 
10-11, 1988, January 16-17, 1989, August 22 
and 24, 1989, October 8 and 31, 1989, and 
November 27, 1989. 
7. County Commissioners, February 1, 1989, 
April 5, 1989 and January 17, 1990. 
8. Summit County Planning Commission, December 
13, 1988. 
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In responding to this interrogatory, it is impossible 
to determine who contacted the Commissioners or what precisely 
was communicated. These responses have been reconstructed from 
all available information. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify all individuals 
employed by Summit County who contacted Utelite Corporation 
regarding the Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 7. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: With regard to the persons 
employed by Summit County who contacted Utelite Corporation 
regarding the Utelite Facility, please state: 
a. The date on which such communication or 
communications occurred; 
b. The type of communication (e.g.) telephone, 
letter, personal communication; 
c. The substance of each and every 
communication regardless of type; and 
d. The person at Utelite Corporation to whom 
such communication was made. 
RESPONSE: Communication was made by most of the 
county representatives mentioned in Interrogatory No. 6 above. 
Dates and particulars of these communications are uncertain but 
have been answered as fully as possible in Response to 
Interrogatory No. 7 above and subject to the same objection as 
set forth therein. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify all persons employed 
by Utelite Corporation who have contacted Summit County 
officials regarding the construction of the Utelite Facility in 
Echo. With respect to each such person, state: 
a. With what official at Summit County the 
contact was made; 
b. The date or datss of all such communications; 
c. The substance of each communication; and 
d. Identify all documents reflecting or 
pertaining Co any such communication. 
RESPONSE: Carsten N. Mortensen made communication to 
the individuals identified in its Response to Interrogatory No. 
6 above and as best as can be reconstructed on the dates listed 
in its Response to Interrogatory No. 7. The substance of such 
communication related to approval, permitting and construction 
of the facility. Documents reflecting these contacts include 
building permit applications dated February 28, 1989, November 
28, 1989, and October 23, 1990 and a letter from the Summit 
County Planning Commission dated January 13, 1989. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: To the best of your knowledge, 
identify all persons not employed by Utelite Corporation who 
h<ive contacted Summit County official on behalf of Utelite 
Corporation regarding the construction of the Utelite Facility 
in Echo. With respect to each such person, state (a) with what 
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official at Summit County the contact was made; (b) the date or 
dates of all such communications; (c) the substance of each 
communication; and (d) identify all documents reflecting or 
pertaining to any such communication. 
RESPONSE: Utelite objects to this interrogatory on 
the basis that they are without sufficient knowledge to 
respond, although it is possible that Union Pacific Railroad 
personnel may have had some contact with Summit County. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all persons employed 
by Utelite Corporation, or persons contacted on behalf of 
Utelite Corporation which officials from Summit County have 
contacted regarding the Utelite Facility in Echo. With respect 
to each state: (a) the name of the Summit County official who 
made the contact; (b) the person with whom the Summit County 
official made contact; (c) the date or dates of all such 
communications; (d) the substance of each communication; and 
(e) identify all documents reflecting or pertaining to any such 
communication. 
RESPONSE: Other than Carsten Mortensen, only Utelite 
attorneys Mike Keller and John T. Nielsen have had contact with 
Summit County regarding the Utelite Facility in Echo. Such 
conversations have been with Summit County attorneys respecting 
the defense of this matter and thus privileged. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Did Utelite Corporation 
receive verbal or written permission to begin the construction 
of the Utelite Facility prior to the time Utelite received a 
building permit. 
RESPONSE: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: If the answer to Interrogatory 
No. 13 is yes, please state (a) the date on which permission 
was granted; (b) the person or persons who gave permission; (c) 
the manner in which such permission was given; (d) identify all 
documents which refer, reflect or relate to the granting of 
permission. 
RESPONSE: 
a. January 13, 1989. 
b. Summit County Planning Commission, Robert 
McGregor, Chairman. 
c. Verbally in meeting on December 13, 1988 and 
in a letter dated January 13, 1989. 
d. Letter of January 13, 1989 from the Summit 
County Planning Commission. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: On what date did Utelite 
Corporation first consider moving the Utelite Facility to Echo. 
RESPONSE: Summer of Fall of 1988. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: On what date did Utelite 
Corporation make its final decision to move the Utelite 
facility to Echo. 
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RESPONSE: Fall of 1988. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Please state with 
particularity each fact which led to the moving of the Utelite 
Facility in Echo. 
RESPONSE: Utelite was informed as early as 1986 of 
the possibility that U.P.R.R. would abandon the railroad spur 
to Park City. It was hoped that even if the spur was 
abandoned, it would only be above the Utelite Facility at 
milepost 13.5. When the railroad told Utelite of their intent 
to abandon on May 19, 1988, several options were considered 
depending upon the extent of the abandonment as follows: 
1. Move to a larger facility at Phoston; 
2. Improve the facility at Wanship and abandon 
above MP 13.5. 
3. Move to Coalville and abandon above 
Coalville; 
4. Move to the abandoned Gas Plant site north 
of Coalville and abandon above that area; 
5. Move the facility to North Salt Lake; and 
6. Move to Echo. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please state with 
particularity each fact that led to the final decision to 
locate the Utelite Facility in Echo. 
RESPONSE: Options 1 through 4 were ruled out because 
of the extent of the abandonment of the railroad. 
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5. Economics because of the haul distance and 
discouragement by the U.P.R.R. ruled out 
option number 5. 
6. The U.P.R.R. suggested the Echo option 
which, after considering the alternatives, 
all agreed would be the best site. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: What was determined to be the 
advantages to Utelite Corporation of having the Utelite 
Facility at its present location. 
RESPONSE: The closest location to the plant at an 
established railroad yard and siding. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Did Utelite consider other 
locations for the Utelite Facility? 
RESPONSE: See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and 
18. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Identify each and every 
location which was considered for the construction of the 
Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and 
18. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please state with 
particularity each fact which led Utelite to not locate its 
loadout facility in the other locations considered. 
RESPONSE: See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and 
18. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 23: What consideration was given 
to other locations for the construction of the Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and 
18. 
INTERROGATORY NO., 24: What were the determinative 
factors in Utelite's decision to build the Utelite Facility in 
Echo rather than other locations. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 18. 
Additionally, this was the preferred location of the Railroad. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: At any time since the 
beginning of construction of the Utelite Facility has Utelite 
Corporation reevaluated or reconsidered its decision to locate 
the facility in Echo. If so state: 
a. The date of each such re-evaluation; 
b. The name of the person or persons making 
that re-evaluation on each such date; 
c. What was Utelite's decision regarding its 
evaluation or the present Utelite Facility 
site . 
RESPONSE: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: What, if any, communications 
regarding the Utelite Facility were made by Utelite Corporation 
to the citizens of Echo who lived in close proximity to the 
Utelite Facility. With regard to any such communication, state: 
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a. The person or persons to whom such 
communications were made; 
b. The date on which such communications were 
made; 
c. The form of or manner in which such 
communications were made; and 
d. The substance of any such communication. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff Frank Cattelan was the first 
person from Echo contacted in the fall of 1988, and from the 
beginning had a few suggestions such as building approvals, 
etc. Cattelan never voiced objections until after Utelite had 
loaded our first few cars, when he complained of a dust 
problem. In the same time period, Utelite had contact with 
Richard Richins. He expressed concerns about moving the road. 
Pete Clark was communicated with during .the early 
phases of the project. He was concerned that people or animals 
might be caught in the "grizzly." The facility has since been 
fenced. 
Richard and Jane Harper have expressed concerns about 
dust. It is unknown when such communications were had. 
Utelite contends that all such concerns have been 
addressed and that Utelite has moved expeditiously and 
effectively to respond to citizen concerns. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 27: What, do you contend, is the 
zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite 
Facility? 
RESPONSE: Utelite objects to this interrogatory as 
not being directed to the party most able to answer. Utelite 
has relied upon the determination of Summit County that the 
facility is a "permitted use" at that location and contends 
that such a determination correctly characterizes Utelite's 
right to maintain and continue the use of the facility. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: What, do you contend, was the 
zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite 
facility when construction of the Utelite facility began? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 27. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: What, do you contend, was the 
zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite 
facility on the day the building permit was issued? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 27. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Did Utelite Corporation obtain 
a certificate of Zoning Compliance from Summit County. If so, 
state the date on which such certificate was issued. 
RESPONSE: Utelite received a letter dated January 
13, 1989 indicating that the Utelite operation "would be a 
permitted use at the Echo site." 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: With regard to Interrogatory 
Nos. 27, 28 and 29, please state with particularity the basis 
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upon which you claim such zoning classification exists 
presently or existed at the time construction of the Utelite 
Facility began or when the building permit was issued. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 27. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 31: State the name and current 
employer of the person employed by Utelite Corporation at the 
time when the planning and construction of the Utelite Facility 
in Echo was begun who you believe was the most knowledgeable of 
your employees regarding the decision to move the Utelite 
Facility to its present location. 
RESPONSE: Carsten N. Mortensen, vice president, 
general manager. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 32: State the name and current 
employer of the person employed by Utelite Corporation at the 
time the planning and construction of the Utelite facility in 
Echo was begun who you believe had the most contact with 
officials from Summit County. 
RESPONSE: Carsten N. Mortensen. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Describe in detail the process 
and procedures which Utelite Corporation went through in 
obtaining approval or permission by Summit County to locate and 
construct the Utelite Facility at its present location. 
RESPONSE: Following the railroad's decision 
respecting relocation and site choice, Carsten N. Mortensen 
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contacted Jerry Smith of Summit County Planning respecting the 
site. Smith indicated that he saw no problem but suggested 
that the matter be reviewed by the Planning Commission. 
Mortensen went before the Planning Commission on December 13, 
1988 and received a letter dated January 13, 1989 indicating 
that the facility would be a ''permitted use" at the Echo site. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 34: What was the amount of the 
projected costs to construct the Utelite Facility in Echo. 
RESPONSE: Around $70,000.00 
INTERROGATORY NO. 35: What was the total cost of 
construction of the Utelite Facility in Echo. 
RESPONSE: Around $120,000.00 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36: On what date, if any, did 
Utelite file with Summit County a detailed site plan drawn to 
scale as part of the application for a building permit. 
RESPONSE: It is believed to be when Carsten N. 
Mortensen met before the Planning Commission and when he 
applied for a building permit. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents in your possession or 
under your control which were relied on, referred to or 
identified in your responses to the foregoing interrogatories. 
RESPONSE: The only documents identified are the 
letters from the Summit County Planning Commission dated 
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January 13, 1989 and the Building Permit Applications. These 
documents are produced with this response. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents addressing or 
discussing the Utelite Facility located in Echo. This request 
includes, but is not limited to, correspondence between Utelite 
and officials of Summit County, documents discussing the 
decision to move the Utelite Facility to its present location, 
documents regarding and including the request and application 
for a building permit to build the Utelite Facility, documents 
relating to the fees required or not required for the building 
permit and all other internally generated or externally 
generated documents which refer, reflect, or relate to the 
Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: Utelite has entered into certain 
agreements with Union Pacific Railroad for use of the property 
at Echo rail yard. These agreements contain information, 
financial and otherwise, which is confidential and has no 
bearing on the subject matter of this lawsuit and for this 
reason the same are not produced. The Approval Order from the 
Bureau of Air Quality is produced herewith. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Please produce any and all documents 
which refer, reflect, or relate to each and every communication 
received by Utelite or of which Utelite is aware that discuss, 
mention, or touch upon Summit County's approval of the Utelite 
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Facility or of Summit County's granting of a building permit 
for the Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 1 above,. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Please produce the entire application 
for the building permit for the Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 1. Documents 
are produced herewith. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Please produce the certificate of 
zoning compliance which Utelite received as part of the 
application procedure. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Please produce the building permit 
for the Utelite Facility. 
RESPONSE: A copy of Permit No. 89201 is produced 
herewith. Permit No. 89007 issued February 28, 1989 is not 
available. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Please produce all documents 
evidencing the fees which were paid to Summit County by Utelite 
Corporation in connection with the construction of the Utelite 
Facility including, but not limited to building permit fees and 
investigation fees. 
RESPONSE: The only fees paid so far as are known are 
those required with the building permit application. Said 
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applications, produced herewith, show amount of fees actually 
paid. 
DATED this ]Jj_ day of December, 1990. 
As to Objections: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By 
n \ 1. Nielsen \ 
orneys for Utelite Corporation 
South Main Street, Suite 1600 
n / n ~ „ /. Q -\ /. n 
John\T. Nielsen 
Att( 
50 
P. 0/ Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
UTELITE CORPORATION 
'Carsten N. -ffortensen 
Vice President 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On December , 1990, appeared before me Carsten N. 
Mortensen, Vice President for the defendant Utelite Corporation 
who duly acknowledged under oath that he is the signer of the 
foregoing Defendant Utelite Corporation's Response to 
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production, that he is duly authorized by the defendant to sign 
said responses, and that the information set forth therein is 
true and correct to the best of his knowledge. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res idmg at : 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LUDMILAGRYGAR 
S*flLA«©CKY Ut t - M11t 
iftetftn**' is. iwa 
STATE OF UTAH 
5 2 8 0 N ( 1 0 ) 
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Addendum A. 3 
The 
Dewtopment 
Code 
of 
Prepared for the purpose of guiding 
the growth of Summit County 
in harmony with its rich heritage, 
serene environment 
and exciting future! 
(42) Mobile Home Lot A designated site within a mobile home p*rk for 
the exclusive use of the occupants of a single mobile home. 
(49) Mobile Home fork An area or tract of land of at least three (5) 
acres used to accommodate two (2) or more mobile homes and which remains 
in single ownership. 
(50) Mobile Home Subdivision A subdivision of at least three (5) acres 
which is reserved for the placement of mobile homes and not other types of 
dwelling units. 
(51) fen-conforming Building or Structure A building or structure or 
portion thereof, lawfully existing at the time this Code became effective, 
which does not conform to all height, area, and yard regulations of the 
zone in which it is located. 
(52) Nonconforming; Use A use which lawfully occupied a building or land 
at the time this Code became effective and which does not conform with the 
use regulations of the zone in which it is located. 
(55) Permitted Use A use of land for which no conditional use permit is 
required. 
(54) Rest Home (Nursing Home) A heme for the aged, chronically ill, or 
incurable persons in which three (3) or more persons not of the immediate 
family ^re received, kept, or provided with food and shelter or care for 
compensation; but not including hospitals, clinics, or similar institu-
tions devoted primarily to the diagnosis and treatment of the sick or 
injured. 
(55) Recreation Vehicle Any trailer house, camper, van or similar 
vehicle used or maintained primarily as a temporary dwelling for travel, 
vacation, or recreation purposes and having a width of nine (9) feet or 
less or a length of 35 feet or less. 
(56) Recreation Vehicle Park Recreational Vehicle Park shall mean an 
area or tract of land used to accommodate two (2) or more travel trailers, 
vacation vehicles, or caliper units for a short period of tine (less than 
30 days.) 
(56) Sanitary Landfill An area designated for the disposing of refuse 
on land without creating nuisances or hazards to public health or safety, 
by utilizing the principles of engineering to confine the refuse to the 
smallest practical area, to reduce it to the smallest practical volume, 
and to cover it with a layer of earth at the conclusions of operation or 
at more frequent intervals as may be necessary. 
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(57) Substantial Improvement Any repair, reconstruction, or improvement 
of a structure, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of the 
market value of the structure either: 
(1) before the improvement or repair is started, or 
(2) if the structure has been damaged and is being restored, before 
the damage occurred. For the purpose of this definition "Substantial 
improvement" is considered to occur when the first alteration of any 
wall, ceiling, floor, or other structural part of the building 
commences, whether or not that alteration affects the external 
dimensions of the structure. The term does not, however, include 
either; 
(1) any project for inprovement of a structure to conply with existing 
state or local health, sanitary, or safety code specifications which 
are solely necessary to assure safe living conditions, or 
(2) any alteration of a structure listed on the National Register or 
Historic Places or a State Inventory of Historic Places. 
(58) Setback A front, rear, or side setback shall be the minimum 
horizontal distance between the lot line and building or structure. 
(59) Story That portion of a building included between the surface of a 
floor and the ceiling next above it. 
(60) Street Any right-of-way serving as the principal means of access 
to property. 
(61) Structure Anything constructed or erected which requires location 
on the ground or attached to something having location on the ground. 
(62) Subdivision The term "subdivision" means the division of a tract 
or lot or parcel of land into three or more lots, plats, sites, or other 
divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or 
of building development; provided that this definition shall not include a 
bonafide division or partition of agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes, or of commercial, manufacturing, or industrial land for 
corrHTErcial manufacturing, or industrial purposes. For the purpose of this 
Code, the division of land into three (3) or more lots less than 20 acrea 
in size by the same individual or party over any 12 year period shall be 
presumed to be for sale or for building development. 
(63) Use, Accessory A subordinate use customarily incidental to and 
located upon the same lot occupied by the main use and devoted exclusively 
to the main use of the premises. 
l-f> ( a \ 
Construction or removal of any building or structure or any part thereof as 
provided or as restricted in this Code shall not be commenced, or proceeded 
with, except after the issuance of a written permit for the same by the county 
building inspector. Provided, however, construction that does not increase the 
enclosed floor space of the building shall be exempt from the requirement of 
a building permit. Prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit sh?ll be 
. .u~ ~u# . - : .» • .* - ^c _ ^ * . • £ • - _ * - ~ r IT r^=—•.. . . .« "Z—> . " TT"! _ _ 1 • TL • ~ • '•.«!_ 
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filed as part of any application prior to consideration for any building permit. 
The site plan shall show where pertinent: 
CD Note of scale used, 
C2) Direction of North point, 
(3) Lot lines together with adjacent streets, roads} setbacks^_and 
rights-of-way. 
(4T~Location of all existing structures on subject property and 
adjoining properties (completely dimensioned, including utility 
lines, poles, etc), 
C5) Location of the proposed construction and improvements, including 
the location of all signs. 
(6) Motor vehicle access, including individual parking stalls, circula-
tion patterns, curb, gutter, and sidewalk location. 
(7) Necessary explanatory notes, 
CB) Nat^ e, address, and telephone number of builder and owner. 
09) All other information that may be required as determined by the 
building inspector, 
1,10 Fire District Review of Building Plans 
Where buildings are to be used for industrial, commercial, or commercial/ 
residential Cfourplex or larger) purposes, building and sitQ plans must be 
submitted for approval of the local fire protection district prior to the 
issuance of the building permit. In the case of disputes over fire district 
r?quiYements» t h e fioerd of County Commissioners will make the final deter-
mination as to the requirements after consultation with the interested parties. 
1
-
11
 Fire Protection Facilities to be Installed Prior to Issuance of 
Building Permits 
In?subdivisions, commercial and industrial parks, planned unit developments, 
ana^condominium projects requiring the installation of water systems and 
storage capacity for fire protection under Chapter 13 of this Code, building 
permitslwill not be issued until facilities serving the construction sites 
are .completely installed and operational, or alternatively, upon the approval 
'of the .local fire protection district, .temporary facilities provided. In the 
case-af',di«pute»"over fire district requirements, the Board of County Commis-
sioner* will make final determination as to the requirements after consultation 
witn the interested parties. 
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1.12 Water Required for Building Permit 
A source of water must be provided prior to the issuance of a building permit 
for a dwelling. If the dwelling is to be served by an existing water system 
the building permit application must be accompanied by a statement from a 
representative of the system indicating that the water hook-up will be allowed 
and that the system can deliver adequate quality/ quantity, and pressure 
to the proposed dwelling. 
If a private source of water is to be developed that building permit application 
must be accompanied by evidence of water rights or ownership of the proposed 
source or supply, application numbers from filings with the State Divis^cr. 
of Water Resources, and evidence that the source can be adequately isolated 
from all present and potential sources of pollution in accordance with State 
standards. 
1.13 Address Required for Building Permit 
An address in conformance with the Summit County Addressing System must be 
assigned before issuance of a building permit. All addressess shall be 
assigned and/or approved by the County Planning Office. 
1.14 Issuance of Building Permits Prior to Completion and Acceptance of 
Required Improvements 
Building permits may be issued for construction in subdivisions and other 
projects prior to the completion and acceptance by the County of the required 
property improvements. In such cases, the County Building Inspector may re-
quire that the applicant for a building permit sign a statement indicating 
the following: 
(1) That the applicant is aware of the terms of the bond or escrow 
account established to guarantee completion of required improvements 
to the satisfaction of the County. 
(2) That the applicant releases Summit County from liability for in-
stallation, maintenance, or repair of the required improvements until 
the same have been completed and accepted by the County. 
(3) That the applicant assumes all risk in connection with construction 
on the subject property. 
1.15 Enforcement 
All departments, officials, and public employees of Summit County vested 
with the duty and authority to issue permits, licenses, or certificates of 
zoning compliance shall conform to the provisions of this Code and shall 
not issue a permit, license, or certificate of zoning compliance for use, 
building, or other purposes where the same would be in conflict with this 
Code, and any such permit, license, or certificate issued in conflict with 
the provisions of this Code, shall be null and void. 
The Building Inspector and Zoning Administrator are charged with enforce-
ment of this Code and are authorized either personally or through a duly 
authorized representative, to inspect or cause to be inspected all building 
and structures in the course of construction, modification, or repair and 
to inspect land uses to determine compliance with this Code. 
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1.16 Penalties 
Any person, firm, or corporation, whether as principal, agent, 
employee, or otherwise, violating or causing the violation 
of any of the provisions of this Code shall be guilty or a 
misdemeanor and punishable as provided by law. The County 
Attorney, or any owner of real estate adversely affected by 
a violation of this Code, may institute injuntion, abatement, 
or any other appropriate legal action to prevent, enjoin, abate, 
or remove any erection, construction, alteration, maintenance, 
or use in violation of this Code. 
1.17 Time 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this 
Code, the day of the act, event, or decisions from which the 
designated period of times begins to run is not included. The 
last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless 
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event 
the period runs until the end of the next day which is not 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. Intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays shall be included in the 
computation. The date of a decision shall be the date of the 
hearing or the date the decision or recommendation is made. 
If no hearing is held on the matter, the date of decision 
or recommendation shall be the date written notice of such 
decision or recommendation is mailed to the applicant. 
1.18 County Planning Commission 
The Summit County Planning Commission shall operate pursuant 
to 17-27-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. All members 
of the Summit County Planning Commission shall reside and own 
real property in Summit County and a majority of said com-
mission shall reside in the unincorporated areas of the county. 
NONCONFORMING BUILDINGS AND USES 
3.1 Maintenance Permitted 
A nonconforming building or structure may be maintained and the occupancy 
of such building or structure may be continued. 
3.2 Repairs and Alterations 
• * • 
Repairs and structural alterations may be made to a nonconforming building 
or to a building housing a nonconforming use. 
3.3 Restoration of Damaged Buildings 
A nonconforming building or structure and a building or structure occupied 
by a nonconforming use which is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or 
other calamity or act of nature may be restored, and the building or structure 
or use of such building, structure, or part thereof may be continued or 
resumed, provided that such restoration is started within a period of one 
year from the date of destruction and is diligently prosecuted to completion. 
Such restoration shall not increase the floor space devoted to the nonconform-
ing use over that which existed at the time the building became nonconforming. 
3-4 Discontinuance or Abandonment 
A nonconforming building or structure or portion thereof or a lot occupied 
by a nonconforming use which is, or which hereafter becomes abandoned or 
which is discontinued for a continuous period of one year or more shall 
not thereafter be occupied, except by a use which conforms to the regulations 
of the zone in which it is located. 
3.5 Change of Use 
The nonconforming use of a building or structure may not be changed 
except to a conforming use; but where such change is made, the use shall not 
thereafter be changed back to a nonconforming use. 
3.6 Expansion of Use Permitted 
A nonconforming use may be extended to include the entire floor area of the 
existing building in which it is conducted at the time the use became 
nonconforming. 
3.7 Nonconforming Use of Land 
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this Code became 
effective, may be continued, provided that no such nonconforming use of 
land shall in any way be expanded or extended either on the same or adjoin-
ing property, and provided that if such nonconforming use of land, or any 
portion thereof, is abandoned or changed tor a period of one (1) year or more, 
any future use of such land shall be in conformity with the provisions of 
this Code. 
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3.8 Non-Conforming Size of Lots 
Any lot of record at the time of passage of this Code in any zone in which 
single tamily dwellings are permitted and which does not comply with the 
standards of this Code with regard to lot area may be used for a single family 
dwelling, excluding mobile homes unless the lot is at least one acre in size. 
A lot of record shall consist of a lot shown on a recorded subdivision plat 
or described in a recorded metes and bounds description as a deed, sales con-
tract, or survey. In the event the lot was not recorded prior to the adoption 
of this Code, the Board of Adjustment shall determine whether or not there is 
sufficient evidence to deem that the lot existed prior to the date of the pass-
age of this Code. 
3.9 Abandonment 
A non-conforming use shall be deemed abandoned if said use has not applied to 
the premises for a consecutive period of 12 months. 
3.10 Permits Granted Prior to Passage of Code. 
Authorization granted by the county to construct a building or structure 
shall not be denied or abridged in the event that a building permit has 
been issued and such permit is still valid. 
3-11 Subdivision Approved Prior to Passage of Code 
A subdivision which had received preliminary approval from the Planning 
Commission prior to the adoption of this Code shall be allowed in any zone, 
irrespective of zone requirements for lot size, if the requirements for 
final approval in accordance with Summit County Ordinance No. 65 have been 
met and the plat approved within fifteen (15) months of the adoption of this 
Code. 
3-2 
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boundary l o c a t i o n , the Planning Corrmission s h a l l i n t e r p r e t t he map. 
5 Suburban r e s i d e n t i a l zone (SR-1) 
(i) Purpose. Tl>e SR-1 zone is tistabliahed to provide ievidential 
developments on relatively flat terrain and in close proximity to service 
delivery centers or developments already receiving county services. 
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by clustered residences 
on flat terrain and on the most suitable soils for development purposes. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19 
(4) Authorized Uses. See Section 12.20 
(5) Special Provisions. None 
6 Rural Residential Zone (RR-1) 
(1) Purpose. The RR-1 zone is established to provide a location where 
residential development associated with country living and open space can 
be maintained in conpatability with the natural constraints of the land. 
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by uneven terrain with 
dwellings clustered in swells or valleys and/or placed on large lots on 
the steeper slopes. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19 
(4) Authorized Uses. See Section 12.20 
(5) Special Provision. None 
7 Rural Residential Zone (RR-2) 
(1) Purpose. The RR-2 zone is established to provide residential 
development in a rural setting without conflicting with agriculture. 
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by dwelling lots along 
public highways interspersed with agriculture land and associated buildings. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19 
(4) Authorized Uses. See Section 12.20 
(5) Special Provisions. 
(a) This zone extended for 500 feet on either side of the center line 
of maintained public roadways which are designated on the Summit County 
zoning map. Residential dwellings are permitted on lots which have 
frontage along the indicated roadways. At least the required frontage 
width shall be maintained between side lot lines from the front property 
line to the front building setback. Cherry stem or other irregular 
shapped lots are prohibited. 
(b) Duplexes are allowed upon the issuance of a conditional use permit 
with a minimum lot size of 3/4 of an acre, at least 165 feet of frontaqf-
on a maintained public roadway as designated on the Surrmit County zonirq 
map, limited to only one (1) access point; and submittal of a site pla:. 
to be approved by the Planning Commission. 
12.18 ( E ) Snyderville Bas in-Dis t r ic t - SBD-1 
(1) Purpose. The SBD-1 zoning d i s t r i c t i s designed as a s ingle "Code" 
cons is t ing of planning po l i c i e s and development regulat ions wherein 
development proposals are considered on thei r individual meri ts . As with 
other approaches to planning zoning th i s zone promotes the public heal th , 
safety and welfare by maximizing the posit ive impacts of development and 
minimizing the negat ive. 
(2) Cha rac t e r i s t i c s . This zone i s characterized by an innovative approach 
to planning and development approvals in tha t a permit to develop i s 
granted or denied on the bas is of a proposals conpliance with p re -se t 
performance standards (po l ic ies ) covering a wide range of soc ia l , economic, 
environmental, design and public f a c i l i t i e s f ac to r s . Processing and f ina l 
decision on a development appl ica t ion focus on the developers 
"evidentiary package" which consis ts of: an appl icat ion form, plans, 
drawings and rendering, and one-page evidentiary forms for each pol icy, and 
conpleted by the developer. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Snydervil le Basin 
Development Code Chapter 5 , Pol icy, Section 5.6 Absolute Po l i c i e s , Section 
5.7 Relative Po l i c i e s , Section 5.9 Density, and Table 6. 
(4) Authorized Uses. See the Snyderville Basin Development Code Chapter 5f 
Pol icy , Section 5.6 , Section 5 .7 . 
(5) Special Provis ions. 
(a) Permits required. A Class I or Class I I development permit i s 
required for a l l developments in the Sndyervil le Basin Zoning D i s t r i c t . 
(b) Lot s i ze , frontage width, front, side & rear setbacks and 
authorized uses. Due to the uniqueness of t h i s development approva 1 
process , requirements for Section 12.19 and 12.20 wi l l be obtained 
from the standards contained in Chapter 5 and Table 6 of the 
Snydervi l le Basin Development Code. 
12.19 Lot Requirements for Building Purpose. Refer to table of page 12-8 b , c . 
12.20 Authorized Uses in Zones. In the following table permitted uses of 
lands or building are indicated by a "P", conditional uses of lands or 
buildings are indicated by a "C", and if the use i s not allowed i t i s e i t he r 
not named in the use l i s t or i t i s indicated by a "_". See authorized use table 
on page 12.9 . 
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1/.2U Authorized Uses SK-1 RR-1 RR-2 R-l R-5 AC-1 WR-1 WF-I C-l (.R-l HS-1 LI -1 
^1/ Accosi-ory buildings ana" uses customarily 
incidental to permitted and traditional 
uses • 
(2) Agriculture 
A. The raising, cultivating, grazing, 
or breeding of plants or animals in 
unlimited quantities. 
B. Animals and fowl for recreation 
or for family food production for the 
primary use of persons residing on 
the premises. 
C. Agriculture industries or busi-
nesses involving agricultural pro-
duction in manufacturing, packaging, 
treatment, sales, intensive feeding, 
or storage, including animal feed 
yard-;, kennels, fur farms, food 
packaging or processing plants, 
commercial greenhouses, commercial 
poultry or egg production, saw mills, 
and similar uses. 
(3) Dwellings 
A. Single Family Dwellings 
B. Two Family Dwellings 
C. Multiple Family Dwellings in 
Planned Unit Developments 
D. Multiple unit dwellings for 
commercial purposes, i.e., motels, 
hotels, condominiraums, and boarding 
houses, providing that the density 
of units with kitchen facilities shall 
not exceed ten (10) per acre and units 
P 
C 
P 
P 
C 
P 
C 
P 
c P 
p 
p 
p 
c 
SR-1 RR-1 
witnouL kitenen facilities, thirty ( 3 0 ) -
per acre, unless it can be shown that 
adequate fire protection is provided 
to safeguard human life to justify a 
greater height than permitted in Section 
5.6 of this Code; in such cases densities 
may be increased, provided however that 
the density shall not exceed the above 
described densities for each two building 
levels above fire fighting grade. 
E. Multiple unit dwellings for com- - -
mercial purposes, i.e., hotels, motels, 
and condominiums, with no density re-
quirements, provided however that at 
least seventy (70) percent of the pro-
ject, excluding parking space and road 
rights-of-way, is maintained as natural 
or landscaped open space or outdoor 
recreation facilities, i.e., swimming 
pools, tennis courts, etc. 
F. Mobile Homes on one acre minimum lots - P 
(but in no case less than the minimum lot 
b u e required in the zone) and subject to 
requirements of Chapter 10. 
G. Mobile homes for housing agri- - -
cultural employees and subject to 
the requirements of Chapter 10. 
II. Mobile home parks and subdivisions C C 
btibject to requirements of Chapter 10. 
I. Recreation vehicle parks subject - -
to requirements of Chapter 9. 
RR-2 R - l R - 5 AG-1 WR-1 WF-1 C - l C R - 1 H S - 1 L I 
- - - - - - p p p _ 
P 
P P P P P P - - - -
C - - C C C - - - C 
c c - - - - - - c -
c c c c c c c - c c 
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SR-1 RR-i 
J. Farm or ranch housing for employees 
of the farm or ranch. 
(•*) Outdoor Connie rcial recreation acti-
vities including archery and rifle ranges, 
campgrounds, golf courses, dude ranches, 
public stables, ski lifts, public snow-
mobile trails, and other similar uses, C C 
(i>) Saleb Activities 
A. Retail establishments such as 
grocery and general merchandise stores 
and novelty, gift, and photo supply 
stores. - -
15. Service establishments, including 
barber shops, confectionary shops, 
laundromats and dry cleaners, indoor 
recreation centers, mortuary, home 
appliance repair shops, banks, and 
other similar commerce. - -
C. Travel service and entertainment 
establishments such as automobile 
service stations, restaurants, drive-
in food stands, and theatres. - -
D. Office buildings, including clinics, 
animal hospitals, and other office 
activities, 
E. Liquor and beer sales and places 
for the drinking of liquor and beer. - -
F. Neighborhood convenience stores 
for the primary use of the residents 
in the immediate vicinity. C C 
RR-2 R-l R - 5 AC-1 WR-1 7 - 1 C- i Clt-i HS-1 LI -1 
" " "" I I I • » • • i n . n • li • ii • • • • » i t • , i • — • .in • ' — — 
C - - p p ) ' - - - -
c c c c c c c c c c 
C P P P 
p p p 
c p p p 
C - - - - - P C C I ' 
- - - - - r p p p -
C C - - - - P P P P 
SR-1 RR-1 
(6) Home Occupations 
A. Home occupations conducted entirely 
within a dwelling by one or more persons 
residing within a dwelling not to include 
however the sale of commodities except 
those which are produced on the premises 
and involve the use of any accessory 
buildings or yard space. Qualifying home 
occupations include the use of the 
home by a physician, surgeon, dentist, 
or physical therapist for emergency 
consultation or treatment or for the use 
of a lawyer, engineer, or other pro-
fessional person for consultation and for 
auxiliary use; the occupation of an 
artist who gives private lessons in voice, 
dance, boxing, piano or other musical 
instrument limited to a maximum of eight 
(S) pupils at a time; a foster home or 
child care center for not more than eight 
(8) children at a time; the renting of 
one or more rooms to not more than four 
(4) persons provided that one additional 
space of off-street parking be provided 
for each two renting persons. P P 
B. Home occupations involving the use 
of yard space or accessory buildings and 
including the sale of commodities not pro-
duced on the premises, provided however 
that such occupation shall not be detri-
mental to adjacent property owners. Such 
occupation shall be subject to annual 
issuance and annual reissuance of home 
occupation permits by the Hoard of Commis-
sioners. Such home occupations include 
ho:nc appliance repairs, carpentry, and 
the raising of animals for other than 
lan-.ily use or consumption. C C 
RR-2 R-l R-5 AG-1 WR-1 WF-1 C-l CR-i !IS-1 L I - l 
P P p p p p p p p p 
^
C C C C C P P P P 
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(7) ri ivate Service Activities 
A. Child day care or nursery C C C C C C - - P 
B. Private educational institution 
having a curriculum similar to public 
schools and approved by the state. C C C C C C C - P 
C. Private institution or organization 
recreational grounds and faci l i t ies , not 
open to the general public and to which 
no admission charge is made. C C C C C C C C C 
I). Rest or convalescent homes C C C C C C C - C 
£. Piivate parks, recreational grounds 
recreational camps or resorts, including 
accessory or supporting dwellings or 
dwelling complexes and conuiiercial service 
uses which are owned or managed by the 
lecreational facili ty to which they are 
accessory. C C C P C C C C P 
(d) Public or Quasi Public Service Activities 
A. Power generation plants, dams and 
reservoirs, transmitting stations and 
substations, and television satallite 
stations. C C C C C P P C C 
B. Hospitals, medical clinics, ceme-
ter ies , and churches. C C C C C C C - P 
C. Public buildings P P P P P P P - P 
D. P a r k s P P P P P P P C P 
{<*) Processing and Manufacturing 
/v. Quarries, gravel pits, open pit 
mines, and tunnel mines. - - C C C P P C -
B. Oil wells, natural gas wells, 
r-ist>*' bei.jr^ - s ~ i J ' i i » m\ * \ ^m » < * * ••• i T i i ~i 
SR-1 RR-1RR-
C. Rock crushers, concrete batching 
plants, asphalt plants, and petroleum 
refineries. - - -
D. Manufacturing, curing, compounding, 
processing, packaging, and treatment of 
bakery goods, candy, cereal, pharma-
ceuticals, toiletries, cosmetics, 
sporting goods, and other goods which 
will be manufactured by non-polluting 
methods. - - -
E. Uses which because of their incom-
patibility with domestic activities 
are required to be located at least 
300 feet from a zone boundary including 
foundary, casting of lightweight non-
ferrous metals, blast furnaces, and 
similar uses. Such uses shall not 
exceed state or federal environment 
protection standards. - - -
F. Manufacturing, processing, refining, 
treatment, distilling, storage, com-
pounding or pipeline transmission 
of acid, amonia, acetylene gas, dis-
infectants, plastics, pot ash, and 
other such materials. - - -
G. Processing, treatment, stabilization 
or storage of liquid or solid wastes 
except agricultural wastes, i.e.; 
garbage, rubbish, trash and other 
refuse material, sewer sludge, raw 
sewage, oil or gas well drilling 
fluids, etc. c 
H. Pipeline transmission of petro-
leum and natural gas. P P P 
I. Welding and blacksmith shops, 
and auto-body repair shops. - - -
R - l R - 5 AG-1 WR-1 WF-1 C - l CR-1 HS-1 L I - 1 
- - C C C - - - P 
- - C C - - - - P 
C C C C C - - - C 
p p p p c p p p p 
- - C - - P - C P 
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(10) Signs subject to Chapter 8 P P 
(11) Transportation 
A. Bus terminal 
B. Freighting or trucking yard 
or terminal. - -
C. Airport 
D. Truck stop and service facilities 
(12) Storage and Warehousing 
A. Coal and fuel yards including but 
not limited to firewood, heating oil, - -
propane, butane and kerosene. 
B. Contractors equipment storage 
,ard and plant. C C 
C. Garage, public 
D. Junk yard 
E. Warehouse 
F. Rental storage sheds - -
(13) Planned Unit Development subject to 
requirements of Chapter 11. C C 
(14) Subdivisions, subject to Chapter 13 
where each lot meets requirements 
of the zone in which it is located. P P 
RR-2 R-l R-5 AG-1 WR-1 WF-1 •
 : L CR-1 HS-1 3,1-1 
P P P P P - . * P P P 
- - - - - - P C C P 
- - - - - - P - C P 
C C C C C C C - - C 
- - - - - - P - P P 
C C C C C C C - C P 
C - - C C C C _ _ P 
- - - - - - C - C P 
- - - C C - - - - C 
- - - - - C P - - P 
C P C C - - P - P P 
C C C C C C C C C C 
P P P - - - P P P P 
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Addendum A. 4 
"Findings" 
No. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
c"r-
fo 
AUG 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER, 
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS, 
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the 
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, 
and UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants, 
H 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Qtri 
"1993 
ofSu^ m/> Co, "My 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ° " P ^ Q | ^ - . tf&\ 
Civil No. 10718 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing July 
8, 1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. The 
Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey W. Appel of Haley & 
Stolebarger, Defendants Summit County was represented by Franklin 
P. Anderson and Defendant Utelite Corporation was represented by 
John T. Nielsen. Argument was heard with respect to Defendant 
Utelite and Summit County's Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Having heard the arguments 
of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, the Court 
makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court hereby adopts the following Findings of Fact: 
1. In the Fall of 1988, Defendant Utelite Corporation 
(hereinafter "Utelite") decided to relocate a railroad loadout 
facility (hereinafter "Utelite facility") to Echo, Utah. 
2. On December 13, 1988, Utelite went before the Summit 
County Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of 
the facility in Echo. 
3. The posted agenda for the December 13, 1988 meeting of 
the Planning Commission provides no notice to the public that 
there would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation 
and construction of the Utelite facility. 
4. The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the 
Planning Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any 
testimony concerning the proposed relocation and construction of 
the Utelite facility. 
5. Utelite received verbal permission at the December 13, 
1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin construction of 
the facility. 
6. On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert 
McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to 
Utelite confirming a discussion at the December 13, 1988 meeting 
of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed relocation of 
the Utelite facility. 
7. The January 13, 1989 letter indicated that it was the 
consensus of the Planning Commission that the Utelite operation 
could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a 
"permitted use" at the Echo site. 
8. Construction of the Utelite facility began on or about 
February 21, 1989 at a location directly across from and adjacent 
to a residential area of Echo in which Plaintiffs reside. 
2 
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9. On February 28, 1989, Utelite applied for and received 
from Summit County, building permit # 89007, which is 
specifically designated as an "electrical permit." 
10. The Utelite facility was substantially completed by 
April 25, 1989, at which time the first loading of railroad cars 
took place. 
11. In October 1989, Utelite made application for a 
building permit from Summit County, which permit was issued on 
November 28, 1989 as building permit # 89291 for the construction 
of the loadout facility in Echo. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that: 
1. Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action 
pursuant to the terms of the Summit County Development Code, the 
laws of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
2. Union Pacific Railroad is not an indispensable party to 
this action. 
3. Plaintiffs in this instance were not required to 
exhaust administrative remedies for the reason that due process 
and other constitutional rights are involved and were violated. 
4. The statute of limitations contained in the open 
meeting law Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1 et seq. has not been violated 
due to application of the equitable tolling doctrine. 
5. The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the 
3 
00i)d6u 
approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite 
Corporation v/as in violation of the provisions of the Summit 
County Development Code and, thus, that decision is null and 
void, 
6. The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the 
approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite 
Corporation was made in violation of the provisions of the Open 
Meeting Act Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1- et seq. 
7. Injunctive relief requiring the County to ensure the 
removal of the Utelite facility is granted with the stay of the 
effectiveness of that portion of this order for sixty (60) days 
from the date of this order, 
DATED this >Z3 day of August, 199 3-
Honorable Homer .Fv'"Wilkinson 
::nO^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
0 
AUG 23 
O.H 
1993 
of Sur
»rn;f Cou 
OfXity Q*k -<j^ 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER, 
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS, 
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the 
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, 
and UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants, 
ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10718 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary judgment is granted and that the actions 
of Defendant Summit County with respect to the zoning decision 
allowing Utelite to occupy its current site was accomplished in 
violation of law, the Summit County Development Code, and the Open 
Meeting's Act and is thus null and void for the following reasons: 
1. The acts and omissions of the Defendants leading to the 
emplacement of the Utelite Facility in Echo, Utah, were contrary to 
the Summit County Development Code and are therefore null and void. 
2. Defendants actions were in violation of the Open and 
Public Meeting's law, Utah Code Ann, § 52-4-1 et seq. 
3. Defendants acts and omissions have harmed Plaintiffs 
without providing them due process of law. 
ew\&»t'v\ TA hv.jLr r- 1 f 
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4. The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60) 
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is taken 
within that time period, then an injunction shall issue and 
Defendant Summit County shall be required to effectuate the removal 
of Utelite from their currently occupied site. 
5. Defendant Utelite Corporation and Defendant Summit 
County's Motions to Dismiss are denied. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
So Ordered: 
Honorab le Homer F . Wi^^jun^c©/^^"*^ 
DflAi/n P Rjfir r 1 7 U00^8o 
Addendum. A. 5 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
3 32 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
October 27, 1993 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK No. 
T I L E D 
°=T 23 M3 
&** of Summit Courrfy 
3rd Dist. Court Summit County 
Appeals Clerk 
Summit County Courthouse 
PO Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Jane Harper, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants, 
*..._ 
D
^*tyO«i .J^ 
No. 930461 
10718 
THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having 
been heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently 
advised in the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory 
appeal be, and the same is, denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
(J00>i8i 
Addendum A. 6 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John T. Nielsen (#2408) u 
Eric C. Olson (fl4108)^ 
Attorneys for Defendant Utelite Corporation 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 ^ 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
L'OU. .)• cyjm.ni: Ov"'.:r,ry 
-dr~ 
Deputy OP&. , ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ty\rO 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RICHINS and THE 
DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plainti f fs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
.bf 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90-03-10718 
Honorable Pat 3. Brian 
On May 30, 1995, this Court heard argument in the 
above matter with respect to the various motions of the parties 
for partial summary judgment on claims and defenses m this 
action. The plaintiffs were represented by James L. 
Warlaumont. The Summit County defendants were represented by 
Jody K Burnett and Franklin P. Andersen. The defendant Utelite 
Corporation ("Utelite") was represented by Eric C. Olson. By 
agreement of the parties, the hearing took place in Salt Lake 
City, Utah rather than in Summit County, Utah. 
/ 
13?\777 f j8 1 BOOKTTPAGE 7 5 4 
The Court having reviewed the submissions of the 
parties, having heard the argument of counsel and being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Utelite' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of nuisance per se is denied. 
2. Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of trespass is denied. 
3. Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is granted. There exists no genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to the alleged outrageousness of Utelite's 
conduct and Utelite is entitled to judgment on the Tenth Cause 
of Action as a matter of law. Nothing in this Order, however, 
shall limit the plaintiffs from claiming damages for emotional 
distress under their nuisance and trespass claims. 
4. Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the claim for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 is granted and the Eleventh Cause of Action is 
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' renewing said 
claim after the conclusion of trial. 
5. The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Utelite' s defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches 
is denied. 
6. The Court reserves until after the jury trial 
herein any ruling on Summit County's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the claim for award of attorney' s fees and costs 
U:'\/7/b8 1 BOQK'U^755 
under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as well as Utah Code Ann. § 
isJcn) 1995 . 
5 4 - 2 - 9 . 
DATED t h i s ip day of —7 
/ G L -M B . B r i a n , Judge 
T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ^WIMII/I/,,, 
Summit County vvNV % K ' ""'' 
Approved as t o Form: 
<&*> 2 U* 
^ f t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
At toyr i eys (flor Summit County 
f e n d a n t s 
% 
10: |v\C°UA/7Y / P 
% o>> <>r >1 
BOOKTTPAGE 7 5 6 
1 3 . ' \ / / / C J 8 1 
Addendum A. 7 
No. 
F I L E D 
Preliminary Instruction To The Jury ^' -»• J '995 
Clark of Summit County Ud t t C r 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: ^ * <£/ -
9fMty Cttcfc* "****'"*••• 
In order to clarify certain issues in this case the court instructs you as follows: 
In 1991, Judge Homer Wilkinson, of this court, in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment found that: (The ruling was signed August 23, 1993) 
1. On December 13, 1988 Utelite received verbal permission from the Summit County 
Planning Commission to begin construction of its facility in Echo, Utah. 
2. On January 13, 1989, a letter was sent to Utelite on behalf of the Planning 
Commission which indicated that it was the consensus of the Planning Commission that the 
Utelite operation could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a "permitted 
use" at the Echo site. 
The court ruled at that time, however, that the actions of Summit County allowing 
Utelite to occupy the site in Echo were contrary to the Summit County Development Code 
and in violation of Utah's Open Public Meeting law, and that, therefore, the County's actions 
were null and void. 
The court then ordered that the county remove the Utelite facility from Echo. There 
was no express finding against Utelite and Utelite was not subject to the courts order. 
The order to remove the facility has been stayed pending an appeal of that order by 
the county. 
Implicit in Judge Wilkinson's ruling is the conclusion that the placement of the Utelite 
facility in Echo is in violation of the Summit County Development Code and this court has so 
ruled. Hence, my previous instruction to you that the location of the facility, being in 
violation of the Development Code is a nuisance per se, or as a matter of law 
This ruling by the court that the facility is a nuisance as a matter of law does not 
mean, by itself, that the plaintiffs have or have not suffered damages. You as the jury are to 
decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the plaintiffs have suffered damages and, 
if so, the amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiffs. You will further be asked to 
decide whether the plaintiffs are entitled, by clear and convincing evidence, to receive 
punitive damages, and if so the amount of such damages. 
UlJfcj 
Addendum A. 8 
No 
F I LE D 
FEB 2 7 1996 /a'-; 
Clerk ot Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMM*!'!1 lULfemLctoft 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RICHINS and THE 
DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants 
FINAL JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 90-03-1071! 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
No. . 
F
 ' L ED 
:HSG 
QeHt of S. ur*mit c ounty 
The damage claims by the plaintiffs herein against 
the defendant Utelite Corporation were tried to a jury in this 
Court on September 12 through 15, 1995. The Court also heard 
the evidence with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for 
equitable relief supplementary to any such relief already 
awarded in this action. 
Judge Frank G. Noel presided at the trial. The 
plaintiffs were represented by James L. Warlaumont. The 
defendant was represented by Eric C. Olson. The Court now 
enters its Final Judgment in this action disposing of all 
remaining claims in this matter. 
Before the commencement of trial, the Court 
determined that the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
entered on August 23, ](_)93 by Judge Homer Wilkinson (the 
"Wilkinson Order11) was law of the case and, by implication, the 
Wilkinson Order included the finding that the Utelite loading 
facility was in violation of the Summit County Development 
Code. Based on this finding implicit in the Wilkinson Order, 
the Court further held that the Utelite loading facility in 
Echo, Utah was a nuisance per se. 
The parties thereafter stipulated to the dismissal 
without prejudice of all remaining theories of liability--
nuisance, trespass and negligence--advanced by the plaintiffs 
against the defendant Utelite Corporation. This stipulation 
did not affect or apply to the claims resolved by Judge 
Wilkinson's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. The 
defendant Utelite expressly waived its right to assert the bar 
of the statute of limitations with respect to any claim so 
dismissed without prejudice. 
The issue of liability being resolved as a matter of 
law and all other remaining theories of liability being 
dismissed without prejudice, only the issues of actual and 
punitive damages were submitted for consideration by the jury. 
The Court submitted the following interrogatories to the jury 
as part of a Special Verdict, which were answered as indicated: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue 
2?\\0OQ\>0 \ ~ 
presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is 
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer "No." Also, any damages assessed 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was Utelite loading facility a proximate 
cause of damages to: 
Richard Harper Yes X No 
Jane Harper Yes X No 
Frank Cattelan Yes X No 
Richard Richins & 
the Dicker Hill Trust Yes X No 
e  
e  
Yes 
 
 
X 
0?/l 3/90 
If you answered question 81 "yes" as to any of 
the plaintiffs then go on to the next questions. 
Otherwise have the foreperson sign the verdict form 
and return to the courtroom. 
2. If you answered question #1 "yes" as to any 
of the plaintiffs then as to that plaintiff answer 
the following questions: 
What amount of money will fairly compensate the 
plaintiffs for damages sustained as a result of the 
loading facility and its operation? 
General Damages: (adverse health effects, 
inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort, loss of 
BOOKlTiiPAGE 9 0 2 
3 
enjoyment of home and property, mental distress and 
emotional injury to the date of trial.) 
Richard Harper $5,000 
Jane Harper $5,000 
Frank Cattelan $3,00C 
Richard Richins & 
the Dicker Hill Trust $1,500 
Reduction in Market Value of Property Affected: 
Richard and Jane Harper $ C 
Frank Cattelan $ C 
Richard Richins & 
the Dicker Hill Trust $_ 
Loss of Business Income: 
Frank Cattelan $ 
Considering all the evidence in the case, do 
you find from clear and convincing evidence that 
plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive and 
exemplary damages, against Utelite Corporation? 
Answer: Yes No X 
The Court having reviewed the Special Verdict of the 
jury, having heard the evidence at trial, having considered the 
argument and submissions of counsel and being otherwise duly 
and sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
BOOKUUPAGE 9 0 3 ^ 
1. The plaintiff Jane Harper is awarded judgment 
against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the amount of 
$5,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate from the 
date of this Judgment. 
2. The plaintiff Richard Harper is awarded 
judgment against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the 
amount of $5,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate 
from the date of this Judgment. 
3. The plaintiff Frank Cattelan is awarded 
judgment against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the 
amount of $3,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate 
from the date of this Judgment. 
4. The plaintiffs Richard Richins and the Dicker 
Hill Trust are jointly awarded judgment against the defendant 
Utelite Corporation in the amount of $1,500 with interest 
thereon at the statutory rate from the date of this Judgment. 
5. With respect to the plaintiffs' claims for 
property damages, loss of business income and punitive damages, 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant Utelite 
Corporation and against the plaintiffs and said claims are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
6. The court does not grant the plaintiffs any 
equitable relief apart from such equitable relief as the 
DOOKU" PAGE 9 0 4 
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plaintiffs may be entitled to pursuant to the terms of the 
Wilkinson order. 
"7C 
DATED th is / 0 day o f o^yewfeer, 1996 
Frank G. Noel, Distric&^^M&W'io,,, 
Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i ^ O \ J t ^ > 
Summit County ^ V s %%% 
1 %COUNTy # § ! 
^ '/J ^ $ 
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Addendum A. 9 
NO. 
F i LE D 
MAY 1 7 1996 
Cleft of Summit County VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Eric C. Olson (#4108K By 
Attorneys for Defendant Utelite Corporation Deputy Oortc 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
j£-
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. 
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN, 
RICHARD RICHINS and THE 
DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body 
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY 
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION and 
UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Civil No. 90-03-10718 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The Court heard evidence at the trial in this action 
held on September 12 through 15, 1S95. The Court has issued 
Minute Entries dated February 13, 1996 and April 25, 1996 with 
respect to the plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief 
supplementary to any such relief already awarded in this 
action. The Court has also entered its Final Judgment of 
Special Verdict resolving, inter alia, the plaintiffs' claim 
for equitable relief. 
U-'UiMOO 1 
On the basis of the jury's verdict and the Court's 
independent determination of facts based on its view of the 
evidence presented at trial including a personal view of the 
properties in question, the Court now enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite") 
operates a loading facility (the "Facility") adjacent to the 
Union Pacific railroad tracks at Echo, Utah. 
2. The plaintiffs own property in the vicinity of 
the Facility. The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run 
through Echo, Utah lie between the Facility and the property 
owned by Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan. 
Trains go through Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of 
fifteen to twenty times per day. 
3. At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads 
an average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln 
dried aggregate products. 
4. Semi-trucks transport the aggregate product to 
the Facility for loading. It takes four trucks approximately 
forty minutes to load a single railroad car. 
5. The Utelite Facility currently operates, with 
occasional exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours. 
2 
6. To deal with dust from the loading operations, 
Utelite has taken the following steps: i 
a. Construction of a metal enclosure at the 
Facility. 
b. Installation of a bag house and duct work 
at the Facility. 
c. Paving of the access road to the Facility. 
d. Installation of curtains and an electric I 
door at the Facility. 
e. Watering down aggregate at the Utelite 
plant. J 
i 
f. Installation of a hood and metal coverings 
over the conveyor belt and drop areas at the J 
Facility. I 
g. Response to resident complaints called in j 
i 
to the Utelite plant including termination of 
loading on windy days. 
7. To deal with noise problems from the operation 
of the Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps: 
a. Installation of a muffler on the bag house, j 
b. Instruction to truckers not to bang J 
railroad cars in connection with loading. 
8. To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has: j 
a. Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility. i 
b. Terminated night loading. 
c. Instructed truck drivers to yield to other 
vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on 
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road 
at the Facility. 
9. As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, 
confirmed by the Court's visit to the Facility while in 
operation and the Court's and third-party's reviev; of videos, 
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation, the 
Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b) 
does not adversely affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of 
their property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to 
the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has equitable power pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-38-1 to enjoin cr abate any nuisance created by 
Utelite at the Facility. 
2. The Court has found solely by reason of Judge 
Wilkinson's August 23, 1993 Crier and the findings implicit in 
that ruling that the Facility is a nuisance per se. 
3. Notwithstanding the Court's finding that the 
Facility is a nuisance per se, m order to obtain further 
equitable relief from this Couit wit:: respect to the present 
operation of the Facility, the plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving that the Facility presently is injurious to their 
IJ'^0300 1 
health, is offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use 
and enjoyment of their property. 
4. The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden 
of proof and are not entitled to any further equitable relief 
from this Court other than the equitable relief previously 
granted by Judge Wilkinson. 
DATED this 
% 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
day of ?//. 1996. 
y 
Summit County 
Frank G. N o e l , Distr^oi^Jjtt t jcw^ 
T h i r d J u d i c i a l Dis£ggffi«>>>wk!f$frs/ 
i t o u n t v v ^ v V ^ '"''"&''' 
/ V SUMMIT m 
^COUNTY M \t\ 
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Addendum A. 10 
JEFFREY W. APPEL (3630) 
JAMES L. WARLAUMONT (33 86) 
BENJAMIN T. WILSON (5823) 
COLLARD, APPEL & WARLAUMONT 
1100 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1252 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER, 
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS, 
and THE DICKER HILL TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the 
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, 
and UTELITE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE: AWARD OF 
PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil No. 90-03-10718 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys 
Fees and the Summit County Defendants Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on this issue came before the Court on November 13, 1995. 
Plaintiffs were represented by James L. Warlaumont; the Summit 
County Defendants were represented by Jody Burnett; and, Defendant 
Utelite was represented by Eric Olson. The Court heard oral 
argument thereon and took the matter under advisement. On February 
13, 1996, the Court entered a Minute Entry denying the Plaintiffs' 
BOOK VV PAGE 2 ' 0 
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County 
^WtyChrk 
motion for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 awarding 
attorney's fees under Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §52-42-9 (1953, as amended). 
In accordance with the Court's Minute Entry, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees is granted under 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-42-9. The Court orders that the Summit County 
Defendants pay $ (I , \_>U to the Plaintiffs for their 
attorneys fees. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1588 is denied. 
DATED this.^2 "^ ) day of April, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
Frank G. Noel
 v v.. 
Third District Court Judg£V^ X^?> 
farf . |Q= 
f \coa/v r y i? / 
i n A i i i c! . i t • I <•>• 
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Addendum A. 11 
yS.am/nfl' £>.otintp' ' fflaft/u/ty fjc.Pvutetcft' 
Summit County Court House 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Not ice i s hereby r i v n n t i n t fit? Summit CounW I 1 mnjnp Comrnrsion v.- I l l I o l d 
t h e i r re/^ulnr meet ing on Tuesdny December 1 ' , 1r^V>, l ^ f i n n i n p , n t 7 : 7 0 p.m. in 
thp OLD SUMMIT COUNTY aXJKTHUUH, County C o u r t l c u r ^ , C o n l v i l l p , Ufcih. 
The proposed ippnda i s as f o l l o w s : 
Southwest Bank, M ichrW Hi ley - Cont inue review f o r ex tens ion o f Uv C l ' iss ?. 
Development Herm i t f o r Sun Pe i k , n h i r f e - s c U e rmstnr p i *nn«d 
o q u e s t r i a n / r e c r o ' j t i o n community. ( I .oo: i t ion - S ^ l i o n r , ?Sf?f» 9t Jf> Township 1 
So. Knnpe 3 E. S Sec t ions % R 51 Township 1 So. P / l l \ . SUWW) 
A c t i o n ongvmob j l 0 , Ken Myors -Request for r^n<n;"»l o r ^ c o n d i t i o n a l u r r pe rmi t 
f o r seasonal snowmobile r ^ n b i l s 1/4 m i le west o f U r US / l n i n d S tn tp l l i r k v i y 
24^ i n t e r s e c t i o n . (Gout lwpst Q m r t o r , Sec t ion v ; Tavnship 1 South, V~mni A i-nst 
SLBSfl) 
Commission & St7<ff -Review o f Developm?nt Code r e v i s i o n s . 
Not LeRil 
Publislcd December Pf<jf10 
The Phrk Record 
The Summit County IVv^  
Postr?d December 2 , 1<W 
EXHIBIT B 
OOOOlO 
Addendum A. 12 
MINUTES OF TDK PLAMNLir. aKUrSIOI) 
MFKI'TNC. Hl'Xn 
DI'L'LMbl-K 15, VR'U 
PREShWf: Robert McGregor, Chairman Jorry Smith, Planning Director 
LaMar Pace Anita Lewis, Planning Coordinator 
Susan Glasminn Franklin Anderson, Dep. County Attorney 
DelRay Hatch 
A13SKNT: Rom Id Robinson, Brent Ovard, Larry Sin [Kind 
The meeting was ca l led to order a t 7:30 p.m. by Chairman, Robert McGregor. 
Southwest Bank, Michael Riley - Continue review fcr extension of tb? Class 2 
Development Permit for Sun Peak, a larn?-scale master planned 
eques t r ian / recrea t ion community. (Location - .Sections 25,26 ft 36 Township 1 
So. Range 3 E. & Sections 30 & 31 Township 1 So. R 4E. SLB*M) 
Franklin Andersen s ta ted a t the November 22, 1°W Planning Commission meeting 
the Planning Commission asked Mr. Andersen to research i f Southvest Bank could 
be considered the or ig ina l appl icant . Being the or ig ina l appl icant , the tine 
l imi t on the permit could be extended. Mr. Andersen said he cou]d not address 
the question with a "yes" or f,nofI answer. Mr. Andersen told tfx? Planning 
Commission i f they were very technical tlie Planning Commission could S3y Sun 
Peak inc . was the o r ig ina l appl ican t . The Planning Commission could be 
equi table in saying the Southvest Bank was UK? original appl icant a s ttr> 
pa r t i c i pa t i ng financing party and owner of portion of tlie land. The Planning 
Commission in the i r own discre t ion can extend the permit. 
Michael Riley said the Southwest Bank Ins Ind clear t i t l e of Uie property since 
mid sumner. Mr. Riley said when po ten t ia l buyers ask about the property the 
f i r s t question i s pr ice and th? second question i s what can be done with the 
property. Mr. Riley said mil l ions of d o l l a r s hive been invested in tlie 
property, the o r ig ina l owners in ten t was to develop the property th i s i s t i e 
reason for tl)e extension. 
Robert McGregor asked i f potent ia l buyers of tt«? pro[)erty are interested in 
developing the property a s was presented by Sun Peak? 
Michael Riley said he does not have a poten t ia l buyer a t the? present t i n e Mr. 
Riley said in te res ted buyers would probably not develop as an equestrian 
complex. 
Robert McGregor said when Sun Peak Jnc. received t IT? Class 2 approval i t was 
without a de f in i t e densi ty . 
EXHIBIT C 
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Jerry Smith said the code s t a t e s an extension of a permit can bo for two years 
but cannot be extended beyond the two years . 
LaMar Pace made a motion to grant fix* extension for two years a s was presented 
with no dens i t i e s determined. 
Sus3n Glasrrann seconded th? motion. 
All were in favor of the motion. Tho motion car r ied . 
Action Snowmobile, Ken Myers - Request for renewal of a condit ional use 
permit for seasonal snowmobile r e n t a l s 1/4 mile west of the US 40 and State 
Highway 248 in t e r sec t ion . (Southwest Quarter, Section 35 Township 1 South, 
Rang? 4 Fast SLB&M) 
Ken Myers s ta ted he i s asking for a renewa] of a conditional use permit for a 
snowmobile ren ta l business. The location would ba approximately .4 of a mile 
west of Quinns Junct ion. Mr. Myers said a t the s i t e th?re wi l l be a t r a i l e r 
for the storage of repai r too l s . He wil l a l so provide off road parking. 
Mr. Myers said tire fence l ine wi l l be patroled so Ui?re would not be a 
t respass problem. 
Latter Pace asked i f the fuel storage had been approved by Ut? Fire Marshall. 
Mr. P&ce S3id during tlie l a s t season the Fire Marslnll expressed concerns over 
the fuel s torage. 
Ken Myers repl ied he had not checked with the Fire Marshall on U>e fuel s torage. 
DelRay Hatch made a motion to grant th? conditional use permit for tiie winter 
season through April 16 subtject to : 1) t i e fence l ine being patroled, no 
trespassing 2) one sign banner placed on the mobile home that meets with 
the developm?nt code 3) approval from the Fire Marstiill regirding tlx? fuel 
s torage . 
LaMar Pace seconded the motion. 
All were in favor of the motion. The motion car r ied . 
Commission & Staff - Review of Development Code rev is ions . 
J e r ry Smith reviewed the Development Code Revisions with the Planning 
Commission. Robert McGregor asked tha t Jerry Smith and Franklin Anderson 
review the Development Code Revisions and form a language t t n t can be added to 
tiie County Master Plan. 
0000.U 
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Minutes o f the November 23, 1988 Planning Commission Meeting were approved as 
presented. 
Meeting adjourned a t 9:00 p.m. 
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(801)336-4151 
January 13, 1909 fv^fl * 'F*^ 
Cars ten Mortensen 
P.O. Box 587 
Coa lv i l l e , UT 84017 
RE: Relocation of Uto l i l r Fncil I UCT. 
Dear Mr. Mortensen: 
This i s to conilrm a discussion i t tlr? December 13th Planning Commission 
meeting re/jarding the re locat ion of tlx? f a c i l i t i e s . 
11 was tlie consensus of Ur^  Connussion tlT31 tlr? Ulel i to operation presently s e t -
up in Wanship on tlx? Union Pacif ic ra i l road l ines could Ix? raved !o tlx? ECIXD 
loca t ion . This would be considered a permi tied use a t tlr? £dx3 s i t e . 
i f you have any quest ions please c a l l tlx? Summit County Planning Office a t 
356-4451 ex t . 306. 
Sincere ly , 
Robert McCrep.or, Clnirnon 
Summit County Planning Commission 
EXHIBIT A 
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17-27-5 COl'NTIKS 
ground.*, place.-, .spaces, properties, utilities, or terminals; methods to encour-
age energy-efficient patterns of developments, the use of energy conservation, 
solar and renewable energy sources, and assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices; the general character, location, and extent of community cen-
ter.-, town sites, or housing developments; the general location and extent of 
tnrest. and open development areas for purposes of conservation, and water 
-upply. sanitary and drainage facilities, or the protection of urhan develop-
ment 
History: L. 1911. ch. 23. i 4; ( \ 1913. 
!!• -21-1; L. 19.V1. t h. 27. J 1; 1981. ch. 44, 5 5. 
NOTKS TO DKCISIONS 
Cower of commiss ion before adoption of to pu*v«« n valid zoning ordinance prior to adop-
maMer plan. Hon of » master plan. Clayland v. Salt I^nke 
A o unt> planning commission has authontv County. 11 I'tah 2d 307. 358 P 2d 633 (196D. 
COI.LATKHAJ, HKKKHK.NTKS 
I tah I J I U | ( r \ i r w . I'tah U-gi-lutiw C..J.S. HU CMS Zoning 55 11 to 13 
i f . . \ 19*1 19*2 I tah I. Ktv 12.r>. 1 T>I Key Number*. - - Zoning «- 15. 
Am Jur. 2d. **J Am .Jur 2d Zoning 
17-27-5. General purposes in making master plan. 
In the preparation of a county master plan, a county planning commission 
•hall make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing 
nndition> and prohahle future growth of the territory within its jurisdiction. 
I he county master plan shall he made with the general purpose of guiding 
Hid accomplishing a co-ordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of 
he county which will, m accordance with present and future needs and re-
»urce>. best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosper-
: \ . or the general welfare of the inhahitants, as well as efficiency and econ-
my in the process of development, including, amongst other things, such 
iistnhution of population and of the uses of land for urbanization, trade, 
:,fiu>try, habitation, recreation, agriculture, arboretum and other purposes, 
- will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, energy conserva-
mn. transport.ition. prosperity, CIVIC activities, and recreational, educational 
ind cultural opportunities; will tend to reduce the wastes of physical, finan-
ial. or human resources which result from either excessive congestion or 
\cessive scattering of population: and will tend toward an efficient and eco-
ornical utilization, conservation and production of the supply of food and 
. ater. and ot drainage, sanitary, and other facilities and resources. 
II 
Hi-t«»r>: I. 1911. ch 23. 4 5; ('. 
9 21-5. I.. 19M1. rh. II. i 6. 
4b8 
ZONING AND PLANNING 1 7 - 2 7 - 7 
NOTKS TO DKCISIONS 
Kcclnniiifiration. tion did not constitute ".spot toning" U c a u s e it 
Where a floral company situated on "Agri- was compatible with the existing master plan 
cultural Zone A-1" land and surrounded hy re*- nnd therefore not arhitrary. capricious, or an 
idential and agricultural properU recpie.Hted abuse of the zoning authonU's discretion 
and wan gTantt^d rvclawufication of it* property Crc*tview.-Hollada> Homeowners. A.-- n \ 
to "C 2" and "KM" tones permitting the erec-
 Kngh Klor.il ("o . 5-15 V 2d 1150 <i:tah li*7t>. 
Hon of multifamily dwellings, the reclassifica-
17-27-6. Method of adopting master plan. 
A county planning commission may adopt the county master plan as a 
whole hy a single resoution, or, as the work of making the whole master plan 
progresses, may from time to time adopt a part or parts thereof, any such part 
to correspond generally with one or more of the functional .subdivisions of the 
subject matter which may be included in the plan. The commission may from 
time to time amend, extend, or add to the plan, or carry any part of it into 
greater detail. The adoption of the plan or any part, amendment, extension, or 
addition shall be by resolution carried by the affirmative votes of not less than 
a majority of the entire membership of the commission and after a full hear-
ing shall have been had thereon after notice of such hearing shall have been 
given once each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper having general 
circulation in, and most likely to give notice to the residents of the localitv 
which would be affected thereby. The resolution shall refer expressly to the 
plans and descriptive matter intended by the commission to form the v.hole or 
part of the plan, and the action taken shall be recorded on the plan or plans 
and descriptive matter by the identifying signature of the chairman of the 
commission The master plan shall be available for public inspection in the 
office of the planning commission at all reasonable times, but its purpose and 
effect shall be solely to aid the planning commission in the performance of its 
duties 
History: I.. I » l l . ch. 2.1, * (J; ('. 1913. 
19-21-fl; L 19.W. eh. 27, % 1. 
( ot.l.All.RAl. KKKKKKNChS 
A . I . . K . D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n foi i n t e r e s t or Right to < m.s.s ,-v., ,ttin.it i<>n of u i t n r - . - < s in 
h i a s of a d m i n i s t r a t o r officer f i t t i n g in z o n i n g h e a r i n g s h e f o i e u d m i t n M i . i l n e z o n i n g awiht . i 
p r o o f i n g . 10 A I. It .Id *>!U i t \ . 27 A 1> H dd l.'Ull 
17-27-7. Adoption of official map — Amendments. 
The board of county commissioners of any county is hereby empowered. 
after receiving the advice of the county planning commission to adopt and 
establish an official map of the county showing the highways. frcewa>s. 
parks, parkways and sites for public buildings or works, including subsurface 
facilities, in the acquisition, financing, or construction of which the count> 
has participated or may be called upon to participate. Such map. in addition to 
showing existing public streets, may show the location of the lines of streets 
on plats of subdivisions which shall have been appro\ed b\ the planning 
•1B7 
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17-27-9. Power of commission to regulate height and size 
of buildings and height and location of trees and 
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use 
of solar and other forms of energy. 
The county planning commission of any county may, and upon order ofthe 
board of county commissioners in any county having a county planning com-
mission shall, make a zoning plan or plans for zoning all or any part of the 
unincorporated territory within such county, including both the full text of 
the zoning resolution or resolutions and the maps, and representing the rec-
ommendations of the commission for the regulation by districts or zones of the 
location, orientation, heights, bulk, and size of buildings and other structures, 
percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of lots, courts, and other 
open spaces, the density and distribution of population, the height and loca-
tion of trees and other vegetation, the location and use of buildings and struc-
tures for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other pur-
poses, and the uses of land for trade, industry, recreation or other purposes. 
Regulations and restrictions ofthe height and number of stories of buildings 
and other structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation 
shall not apph to existing buildings, structures, trees, or vegetation except for 
new growth on such vegetation These regulations may also encourage energy 
efficient patterns of developments, the use of solar and other renewable forms 
of energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar 
energy devices 
Hi*tor>: L. 1911. eh. 23. 6 9; C. 1943. 
19-21-9; L 1981. ch. 41. 5 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANAI \ M ^ 
Unzoiu d land 
Zoning p*.wer in Mineral 
Unzoned land. since to do so would open the door for indn»-
Zoning ordinance doe* not applv rr«trospec- criminate ahum; of zoning regulation* Salt 
tivelv to denv n UM» permit to the owner of I^ke County v Hutchinson. 8 Utah 2d 154. 
unzoned p m p t m who did everything required 329 1* 2d 657 (19581 
of hirn undir the exi-tmg laws Contract* Exercise of zoning power is a legislative 
Funding & Mtg Exih \ Mavnes. 527 V 2d function to he exercised by the legislative bod-
10,3 11 tab 19. l>
 K.h ()f municipalities, the wisdom of a toning 
Zoning p o w e r in general . plan. its necessity, and the nature and bound-
Court.- would nut permit a violation of a a r u s o f l n c 'W* S t r i c t are all matters 
clear mandate of/orung authorities on the ha- within the legislative discretion, and the Su-
«i* of reliance on advice of cuun«*-l. or on the preme Court will avoid substituting it* judg-
ha«is of hard-hip due to compliance or on the ment for that of the zoning authority Crest-
ha.^is that jt was not shown that an.vone el»«c v»ew-Holladav Homeow ncrs Ass'n v Engh Flo-
would .-ufler in p« rfH'tuating the statu* quo. ral Co. 545 V 2d 1150 (Utah 1976) 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 82 Am Jur 2d Zoning Key Number* . — Zoning *» 13. 15. 
» 47 to 56 
C I . 8 . — 101 C J S Zoning 55 9. 11 to 13. 
202 
17-27-10. Planning commission "certification o f zoni 
plan to county commissioners — Public hearin 
The county planning commission shall certify a copy ofthe plan or plan 
zoning all or any part ofthe unincorporated territory within the count \ 
any adopted part or amendment thereof, or addition thereto, to the boat 
county commissioners of the county. After receiving the certification of 
zoning plan or plans from the commission and before the adoption ot 
zoning resolution or resolutions, the board of county commissioners shall \ 
a public hearing thereon, ofthe time and place of which at least thirty d 
notice shall be given by four publications in a newspaper of general cm 
tion in the county. Such notice shall state the place at which the text or i 
so certified by the county planning commission may be examined. No sub^i 
tial change in or departure from the text or map so certified by the coi. 
planning commission shall be made unless such change or departure be t 
submitted to the certifying county planning commission for its approval 
approval or suggestions, and if disapproved shall receive the favorable \m 
not less than a majority of the entire membership of the board of cot 
commissioners. The county planning commission shall have thirls days t 
and after such submission within which to send its report to the county < 
missioners. 
History: I - 1911. ch. 23. 5 10; C. 11M3, 
19-24-10." 
amendment Melville v Salt 1-ake Count\ 
P2d 133 (I'tah 19751 
bias of administrative officer sitting in „ 
proceeding. 10 A L R 3d 694 
Right to tross-examination of witne<-
hearmgs l>efore administrative zoning an' 
ties. 27 A L R 3 d 1301 
Key Numbers . — Zoning «-> 1 r> 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A m e n d m e n t s . 
Unzoned land cannot be initially zoned hy 
COLLATERAL 
Utah !,nw Review. - Comment. Melville v 
Salt l-ake County — Technical Notice A Judi-
cial 1/e.H.son in Avoiding Inevitable Conflicts. 
1975 Utah L Rev 520 
Am. Jur . 2<f. - 82 Am Jur 2d Zoning 5 49 
C.J.S. - 101 C J S Zoning M 12. 14 
A.I-K. — Disqualification for interest or 
REFERENCES 
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17-27-14. Amending zone or zoning district. 
The board of county commissioners may from time to time amend the num-
ber, shape, boundaries or area of any zone or zoning district, or any regulation 
of or within such zone or zoning district, or any other provisions of the zoning 
resolution, but any such amendment shall not be made or become effective 
unless the same shall have been proposed by or be first submitted for the 
approval, disapproval or suggestions of the county planning commission; and 
if disapproved by such commission within thirty days after such submission, 
such amendment, to become effective, shall receive the favorable vote of not 
less than a majority of the entire membership of the board of county commis-
sioners Before finally adopting any such amendment, the board of county 
commissioners shall hold a public hearing thereon, at least thirty days' notice 
of the time and place of which shall be given by at least one publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county. 
History: I~ 1911. ch. 23. I 14; ( \ 1913, ment substituted "rone or zoning dmtrict" in 
10-21-14; L. 198,1. ch. 70. $ I. two places in the firet sentence for "district or 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . The 1983 amend- districts" 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Prev ious ly u n / o n c d land. amendment Melville v Salt I^akc County, 636 
I ruoned land cannot h» mitinl lwoned bv an V 2d 133 <Utah 1975*. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
t'tah IJIW Rev iew. Comment Mel \ i l l e \ A.I~K. — Disqualification for interest or 
Salt l-ake ( ount> I <.<hnu.il Notice A Judi- bias of administrative officer sitting , n zoning 
cial I>e^son m Avoiding Inimitable Conflicts. proceeding. 10 A L R 3d 694 
1.975 Vtuh L Rev .">J0 Right to cross-examination of witneMc* in 
Am. «Jur. 2d. - 82 Am .lur 2d Zoning hear ing before administrative zoning authon-
$$ 57 to 59 ties. 27 A L R 3d 1304 
C^J.S. 101 C.J S Zoning 4 81 et scq Key Number*: — Zoning ** 151 ct i*cq 
17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings. 
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regu-
lations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a hoard of adjustment 
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such 
members Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time 
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners 
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of 
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the 
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of 
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners 
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for 
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appoint-
ments The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of 
such board, and in the event that any regular member he temporarily unable 
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the 
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary 
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose. 
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The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning 
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, jn 
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsisti" 
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt suppl-
mental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rub 
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provi< 
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to approp: 
ate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in tl 
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regul 
tions in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commission* 
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps ar 
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or sinul 
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulation 
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairm. 
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. Tl 
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths ai 
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjust me' 
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedm. 
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing 
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and oth-
official actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of tl 
board and shall be a public record. 
Ilifitory: I* 1941, ch. 23. 5 15; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act". — See the nott i 
19-24-15. der the same catchline followmg § 17-27 . 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
Special except ion*. power to issue special exceptions in the pi 
This section authorizes, but doea not require. ning commission, and to creale a right of 
the county commission to invest the board of peal directly to the county commission i t -
adjustment* with the power to issue special ex- Thurston v Cache County. 626 P 2d 440 (I t 
ceptions to general ordinances, however. 1981) 
county commission has authority to place the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. .Jur. 2<i. — 82 Arn Jur. 2d Zoning C.J.S. — 101 C J S Zoning $$ 201 to J' 
5 254 et seq Key Numbers . — Zoning *-• 351, 352 
17-27-16. Appeals — Powers of board. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrie\< 
by his inability to obtain a building permit, or by the decision of any admmi 
trative ofTicer or agency based upon or made in the course of tl 
adminstration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution A 
peals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any officer, departmei 
board or bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a huildu 
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency based on 
made in the course of the administration or enforcement of the provision-
the zoning resolution. The time within which such appeal must be made, at 
the form or other procedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the g< 
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eral rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to govern 
the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the supplemental rules of 
procedure adopted by such board provided further, that said rules and regula-
tions shall be available to the public at the office of the county commissioners 
at all times. 
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall have the following powers: 
< 1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by 
administrative official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of 
the zoning resolution. 
<2i To hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such 
resolution, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map 
or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is 
authorized by any such resolution to pass. 
<31 Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of 
a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation, 
or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary 
and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict 
application of any regulation enacted under this act would result in pecu-
liar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue 
hardships upon, the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal 
relating to said property, a variance from such strict application so as to 
relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief may be granted 
without substantial detriment to the public good and without substan-
tially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning reso-
lutions. 
The concurring vote of four members of the board in the case of a five-
member board, and of three members in the case of a three-member board, 
shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or determina-
tion of any such administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the 
appellant. 
History: I- 1911. ch . 23, I 16; C. 1943. Meaning of "thia act". — See the note un-
19-24-16. der the name catchline following i 17-27-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A s An MS 
Appeal to county rommiwinn 
Exhaustion of adminis t ra t ive remedies 
Findings required 
Purpose 
Violation of zoning resolution 
A p p e a l to c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n . dmances in the planning commission, and to 
The hoard of adjustments it> constituted hy create a right of appeal directly to the county 
statute a forum for r t \ lew of all adminis t ra t ive commission ilaclf Thurston v. Cache County, 
zoning decision*, hut nowhere is it made the 626 J '2d 440 (Utah 19811. 
exclusive repository of appellate powers, the 
countv commission has authori ty to place the Exhaust ion of administrative rcmcdlea. 
power to issue special exceptions to general or- Where a planning board approved a trailer 
4 7 8 
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park and issued a building permit to defen-
dant*, plaintiff, a landowner who sought to en-
join the defendants from building the park. 
was aggrieved by the decision al though not a 
par ty to the proceedings before the board, and 
plaintiff was required to exhaust his adminis-
t ra t ive remedies provided in this section before 
an action for injunctive relief could be main-
tained. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co . 15 
Utah 2d 305. 392 P 2d 40 (19641. 
A party must exhaust adminis t ra t ive reme-
dies before seeking judicial review of the denial 
of a building permit. Hatch v. Utah County 
Planning Dcp't. 685 P 2d 550 (Utah 1984). 
Findings r e q u i r e d . 
Justification for denial of use permit to 
owner of unzoned land may not be based on 
hearsay and opinion evidence gathered at an 
informal meeting without opportunity to cross-
examine, and without any findings of fact; nor 
may denial be based on the retrospective appli-
cation of an ex post facto zoning ordinance. 
Contracts Funding & Mtg. Exch. v. Maynes. 
527 P 2 d 1073 (Utah 1974). 
P u r p o s e . 
This section is designed to assure speed\ 
peal to the proper t r ibunal of any g n e \ . 
tha t a party may have who is adverted \ 
decision of an adminis t ra t ive agency Its 
dent purpose is to assure the expeditious 
orderly development of a community Lun 
Cottonwood Meadows Co.. 15 Utah 2d 305 
P 2 d 40 (1964> 
Vio la t ion of z o n i n g r e s o l u t i o n . 
l a n d o w n e r s under & 17-27-23 h a \ e a -• 
ra te cause of action in the court> when a \ . 
tion of a zoning resolution is charged 
where the alleged violation of the ordin. 
arose from the adminis t ra t ion of the 7omn, 
dinance by an adminis t ra t ive a g e n o . as , 
vided in this section, appeal from the adm, 
t ra t ive ruling should have been taken to 
proper adminis t ra t ive t r ibunal , or a 
should have l>een commenced in the co 
within ninety days. Lund v Cottonv. 
Meadows Co.. 15 Utah 2d 305. 392 P 2d 
(1964). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. «Jur. 2d. 
5 254 et seq 
82 Am ,Jur. 2d Zoning C..I.S. - 101 C I S Zoning ** 207 to 
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning «-» 354 to -\> 
17-27-17. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 17-27-17 (L. 1941. ch 
23. 5 17; C. 1943. 19-24-17; L. 1953. ch. 27. 
$ 1). relat ing to district planning nimii ih 
was repealed by I^iws 1983. ch 253. s 
17-27-18. Nonconforming uses — Property acquired \ 
county. 
The lawful use of a building or structure, or the lawful use of any land 
existing and lawful at the time of the adoption of a zoning resolution, or in 
case of an amendment of a resolution, then at the time of such amcndnn 
may, except as hereinafter provided, be continued although such use does 
conform with the provisions of such resolution or amendment and such 
may be extended through the same building, provided no structural altera! 
of such building is proposed or made for the purpose of such extension. I 
purposes of this section, the addition of a solar energy device to such build 
shall not necessarily be considered a structural alteration. The board 
county commissioners may provide in any zoning resolution for the rest« 
tion, reconstruction, extension or substitution of nonconforming uses m 
such terms and conditions as may be set forth in the zoning resolution. I 
board of county commissioners may in any resolution provide for the terim 
tion of nonconforming uses, either by specifying the period or periods in wl, 
nonconforming uses shall be required to cease, or by providing a formul. 
formulae whereby the compulsory termination of a nonconforming use ma\ 
so fixed as to allow for the recovery or amortization of the investment in 
nonconformance. 
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17-27-19 roi 'NTIES 
If any county acquire title to any property by reason of tax delinquency and 
such properties be not redeemed as provided by law, the future use of such 
property shall be in conformity with the then provisions of the zoning resolu-
tion of the county, or with any amendment of such resolution, equally applica-
ble to other like properties within the district in which the property acquired 
by the county is located. 
H i s t o r y : [>. 1941, ch . 2.1. fi 18; C. 1943, 
19-24-18. I.. 1981. ch . 44. I 12. 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
Effect of ordinance on nonconforming use 
Estoppel to enforce zoning ordinance 
Kffoct of o r d i n a n c e on n o n c o n f o r m i n g use . 
Where there »»!> a protracted period of unex-
plained vacancy and no burn ing of any noncon-
forming use of residential property for n period 
of \ e a r s . an ordinance against nonconforming 
use m the e \en t of discontinuance of such use 
for one year precluded the issuance of a build-
ing permit for a gasoline filling station Mom-
son v Home . 12 Utah 2d 131. 363 V 2d 1113 
«1961i 
Ea toppc l to en fo rce zoning ordinnnce . 
County wwew^or's erroneous description of 
property an commercial instead of residential 
did not preclude zoning authori t ies from deny-
ing a permit for the construction of a service 
station on a nonconforming use basis. 
Momaion v. Home. 12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P.2d 
1113 (1961). 
Am. ,Jur . 2d. — 82 Am 
>k4 178 to 236 
C..J.S. - 101 CJS Zoning « 180 to 200 
A.I^R. — Amortization of nonconforming 
u^f». \ahdi t> of provisions for. 22 A L R 3d 
1134 
Construction and application of s ta tute or or-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
J u r 2d Zoning dinance requiring notice aa prerequisi te to 
grant ing variance or exception to zoning re-
quirement . 38 A L R 3 d 167. 
Comprehensive plan, requirement tha t zon-
ing variances or exceptions he made in accor-
dance with. 40 A L R.3d 372. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning •» 321 to 338 
17-27-19. Promulgation of temporary regulations. 
The board of county commissioners of any county after appointment of a 
county or district planning commission and pending the completion by such 
commission of a zoning plan, may, where in the opinion of the board condi-
tions require such action, promulgate by resolution without a public hearing 
regulations of a temporary nature, to be effective for a limited period only and 
in any event not to exceed six months, prohibiting or regulating in any part or 
all of the unincorporated territory of the county or district the erection, con-
struction, reconstruction or alteration of any building or structure used or to 
be used for any business, industrial or commercial purpose. 
H i s t o r y : I - 1941. ch . 23. 5 19; C. 
19-24-19; L. 1953. ch . 27. 5 1. 
1943. 
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COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S 
A.I-R. — Validity and effect of " in ter im" 
zoning ordinance. 30 A L R 3d 1196 
17-27-20. Repealed. 
Repea l* . — Section 17 27 20 <L 1941. ch mission of plans to s ta te planning commi^Mi.i 
'23. 5 20. C I'M.'*. H>2l-20». relat ing to sub- * u s repealed b> I-u*j> 1983. ch 253. % 1 
17-27-21. Land plats — Approval — Sale before approval 
as violation. 
All plans of streets or highways for public use, and all plans and plats <• 
land laid out in subdivision or building lots, and the streets, highways, a)le\ 
or other portions of the same intended to be dedicated to public use, or the u.-
of purchasers or owners of loLs fronting thereon or adjacent thereto, locate* 
within the county limits, except those located within any city or town wit hi i 
the said counties, shall be submitted to the county planning commission, i 
one has been created, and approved by such commission before they shall L-
recorded It shall not be lawful to record any such plan or plat in the office << 
the county recorder unless the same shall bear thereon by endorsement n> 
otherwise the approval of such commission. The approval of such plan or pla 
by such commission shall not be deemed an acceptance of the proposed dedica 
tion by the public. Such acceptance, if any, shall be given by action of tin 
board of county commissioners. The owners and purchasers of such lots shal 
be conclusively presumed to have notice of public plans, maps, and reports <• 
such commission affecting such property within its jurisdiction. 
From and after the time when a county planning commission has beei 
appointed no land located within a subdivision as defined in this act shall \« 
sold until and unless a subdivision plat shall have been approved by th> 
planning commission and recorded in the office of the county recorder, excej* 
that in subdivisions of less than ten lots, land may be sold by metes an-
bounds, without necessity of recording a plat if all of the following condition 
are met: (a) The subdivision layout shall have been first approved in writm. 
by the county planning commission, (b) the subdivision is not traversed by th« 
mapped lines of a proposed street as shown on the official map or maps of th» 
county, and does not require the dedication of any land for street or o thn 
public purposes, and (c) if the subdivision is located in a zoned area, each lot it 
the subdivision meets the frontage, width and area requirements of the zonin 
ordinance or has been granted a variance from such requirements by th-
board of adjustment. 
Whoever, being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located within 
subdivision in a county where a county planning commission has been cr« 
ated, transfers or sells any land in such subdivision before a plan or plat < 
such subdivision has been approved by such planning commission and, excep 
as set forth in the preceding paragraph, recorded in the office of the count 
recorder, shall be guilty of a violation of this chapter for each lot or parcel -
transferred or sold; and the description of such lot or parcel by metes an 
bounds in the instrument of transfer or other document used in the process < 
selling or transferring shall not exempt the transaction from such penalties <•• 
from the remedies herein provided. 
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17-27-22 COUNTIES 
Hi s to ry : L. 19*1. ch . 23. 5 2 1 : C. 1943. 
19-24-21; U 1953. ch . 27. i 1: 19H3. ch . 37, 
5 3. 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1983 amend-
ment subst i tuted "\ iolat ion of thi«* chapter" for 
"misdemeanor" in the last paragraph, and de-
leter! T h e tount> ma> enjoin such transfer or 
No civil l iabi l i ty for v io la t ion . 
The purp<>M' <>f thi> -ectmn and 4 57-5-5 is to 
impose a dut> running to the Mi\ereipn. and a 
H i s to ry : C. 1953. 17-27-23. e n a c t e d by I~ 
1943. ch. 37. 5 4. 
R e p e a l s a n d E n a c t m e n t * . Laws 1983. 
ch 37. 5 4 repealed former ft 17-27-23 <L 
1941. ch 23. i 23. C 19C1. 19-24-23. I. 1973. 
sale or ajrreement by action for injunction 
brought in any court of equity jurisdiction or 
may recover the said penalty by civil action in 
any court of competent jurisdiction"' a t the end 
of the section. 
Meaning of "this ac t " . — See the note un-
der the same catchhne following i 17-27-2. 
violation thereof does not necessarily g i \ e rise 
to civil liability Ellis v Hale. 13 Viah 2d 279. 
373 P 2 d 382 11962 > 
ch 197. i 2). relating to violations, and en-
acted present 4 17-27-23 
Cross-References . — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, 55 76 3 201. 76-3-204. 76 3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
17-27-22. Maximum regulation to govern. 
Wherever the regulations made under authority of this act require a 
greater width of size of yards, court, or other open spaces, or require a lower 
height of buildings or smaller number of stories, or require a greater percent-
age of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are 
required in or under any other statute, the provisions of the regulations made 
under authority of this act shall govern. Wherever the provisions of any other 
statute require a greater width or size of yards, courts, or other open spaces, or 
require a greater percentage of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other 
higher standards than are required by the regulations made under authority 
of this act. the provisions of such statute shall govern. 
His to ry : I - 1911. ch . 23, 5 22; C. 1943. M e a n i n g of "this act". — See the note un-
19-24-22. der the same catchhne following i 17-27-2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C..J.S. 1(» 1 C J S Zomnn 5 10 
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning * j 14 
17-27-23. Violation of chapter or ordinance as misde-
meanor— Remedies of county and owners of real 
estate. 
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any adopted county zoning, subdivi-
sion, or official map ordinance is punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The 
board of county commissioners, the county attorney, or any owner of real 
estate within the county in which such a violation occurs, may, in addition to 
other remedies provided by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, 
or any other appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or 
remove the unlawful building, use, or act. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Injunctions. required to obtain injunctive relief .n:.< 
Under this section, injunctive relief is avail- violation of a toning resolution Ct.ih < 
able as an a l te rna t ive to criminal prosecution; v. Baxter 635 P 2d 61 (Utah H)H1» 
a specific showing of i r reparable injury is not 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. - H2 Am. Ju r . 2d Zoning C . J .S . - 101 C J S Zoning * 3i»u . • 
55 242 to 253 Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning *-» T*>1 it 
17-27-24. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 17-27-24 lL 1941. ch. cording of wining regulat ions and m.t}> 
23 .5 24; C. 1943. 19-24-24). re la t ing to the re- repealed by I,aws 1977. ch 73, i 1 
17-27-25. Enforcement — Acceptance of grants . 
The board of county commissioners is empowered to enforce the /> 
regulations and restrictions which are adopted, and to accept grants of u, 
and service for these purposes, and other purposes, in accordance with th< 
from either private or public sources, state or federal. 
History: I - 1941, c h . 23, 5 25; C. 1943, M e a n i n g of " t h e act". — See the n. 
19-24-25. der "meaning of ' th is act '" following * 1 
17-27-26. Conformity with plan — Exceptions. 
None of the provisions of this act shall apply to any existing bin I 
structure, plant or other equipment, except as provided in fc 17-27-1H 
the adoption of a plan, all extensions, betterments or additions to builc 
structures, plants or other equipment of a public utility shall be ma 
conformity with such plan, unless, after public hearing, the public M 
commission of the state or its successor commission, finds that the pi 
relation to the extensions, betterments or additions is arbitrary and capr. 
and orders that such extensions, betterments or additions be made 
though they conflict with the adopted plan. 
History: I~ 1941, ch . 23 . 9 28; C. 1943, tions is arbi trary and capricious and or.: 
19-24-26; L. 1953, ch . 27, ft 1; 1983, c h . 2-14, the second sentence for if an>. ord. 
• I. such extensions, bet terment* or addn 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1983 amend- buildings, s t ructures, plant or other e<n. 
ment deleted "as hereinbefore provided" after
 a r e reasonable and"; and made minor » 
"adoption of a plan" in the second sentence; j n phraseology 
deleted "only" before "be made" in the second M e a n i n g of " t h i s a c t " . - See the i. 
sentence, subst i tuted finds tha t the plan in
 d e r t h e 8 f l m e c a t c h h n e f o U o w l n K < j , 
relation to the extensions, be t te rments or addi-
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Addendum A. 15 
Pt BL1C OKFICKRS 
\ hen a public officer supervises a relative under Subsection (b): 
n the public officer shall make a complete written disclosure of 
- relationship to the chief administrative officer of the agency or 
titution; and 
m the public officer who exercises authority over a relative may 
' evaluate the relatives job performance or recommend salary in-
.i**es for the relative. 
pointee may accept or retain employment if he is paid from public 
he is under the direct supervision of a relative, except as follows: 
.e relative ua> appointed or employed before the public officer 
• d his position, if the relative's appointment did not violate the 
>ns of this chapter in effect at the time of his appointment; 
hi' appointee wa> or is eligible or qualified to be employed by a 
nent or agency of the state or a political subdivision of the state as 
it of his compliance with civil service laws or regulations, or merit 
laws or regulations; 
Mr appointee is the only person available, qualified, or eligible for 
- i t i o n ; 
he appointee i^  compensated from funds designated for vocational 
he appointee is employed for a period of 12 weeks or less; 
'<e appointee is a volunteer as defined by the employing entity; or 
he chief administrative officer has determined that the appointee's 
e is the only person available or qualified to supervise the appoin-
1931. ch 13,§ 1 ; K S . 1 9 3 3 & C 19SS. mih-tituted "an emplo\ee~ for "a new em-
!. I„ 1953. ch . 79. ft 1; 1955, ch . plovev" in Subsection <lMa). added Subsection 
ch . 159. 5 1; 19H8. ch . 25. ft 1. «'JMIIMI», and redesignated former Subjections 
nt Notes . The I9s7 amend- <2nh><i> to (2»(bMvii as present Subsections 
\h\< a c t i o n ciNbMui to (2Mb)(vn». 
tnu ndment effective April 25. 
NO IKS TO DECISIONS 
• n thohe who may not be qualified to serve. 
*hich anti nepotism statute ' , are Ilackman v Bateman. I Utah 2d 153. 263 P.2d 
neffiru ncv in public office hv offi- 5<il 119531 
C their re la t ive- and appoint ing 
COl.l VThKAL R h r h R K N C K S 
2d. — 63A Am .Jur 2d Public Of- of -t.ite constitutional or s tatutory provision 
rnplo\e«'s 5 101 regarding nepotism in the public service, 11 
»>7 C.J S Officer* and Public Km A I. H 4th 826 
Key Number*. — Officers and Public Em-
Valldit>. construction and effect ploveea *-» 29 
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52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
Each day any such person, father, mother, hushand, wife, son, daughter, 
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, fa-
ther-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is 
retained in office by any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate 
offense. 
Hintory: ! - 1931. ch. 13, ft 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943. 4 9 1 2 2 . 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Ilinlory: I - 1931. ch . 13. ft 3; U.S. 1933 & C. Cross References . — Sentencing for misde-
1943, 49 -123; !~ 1953. c h . 79, ft 2. meanors . tft 7b-3-201, 76-3-204. 76-3-301. 
52-3-4. Exception in towns. 
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the employment of uncles, aunts, 
nephews, nieces or cousins. 
History: 1„ 1931. ch . 13. ft 4; U.S. 1933 A C. 
1943. 49-12-4. 
CHAPTER 4 
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 
Section 
52 4-1 
52 4 2 
52-4-3 
52-4-4 
52-4 5 
Declaration of public policy 
lVfimtion* 
Meetingn open to the public - Ex-
ception* 
O w e d meet ing held upon vote of 
memlx'rw — HUM new - Reasons 
for meet ing recorded 
l*urpo*e* of cloned meeting* — 
Chance meeting* and soual meet-
ings excluded — Disruption of 
meet ings 
52-1 6 Public notice of meet ings 
52-4 7 Minutes of open meetings — Public 
records — Recording of meetings 
52-4 H Suit to void final action - Limita-
tion — Kxceptions 
52-4-9 Enforcement of chapter — Suit to 
compel compliance 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and declares that the state, 
iLs agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the peo-
ple's business. It is the intent of the law that their actions he taken openly and 
that their dehlwrations he conducted openly. 
History: U 1955. ch . 133. ft I; 1977. ch . 
ISO. ft 1. 
Cro»»-Reference*. Cemeter> mainte-
nance commissioner*. l>ojird meet ings public. 
ft 8 1-13 
County commissioners, board meetings pub-
lic. * 17-5-8 
County improvement district board of 
t rustees meet ings. § 17-6-3 4. 
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Judicial Count11 met*tings. Rules of Judic ia l 
Administrat ion. Rule 2-103 
Liquor control commission meet ings to be 
open. $ 32A-l-6<6' 
Municipal governing bodies, meet ings sub-
ject to this chapter . * 10-3-601 
State money management council meetings. 
§ 51-7-16. 
S ta te board of financial inst i tut ion* subject 
to this chapter, $ 7-1-203(3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicahilit> 
IMilHTation-
App l i cab i l i t y . 
This chapter 
Sta te Retiremer 
Retirement Bd . 
198X> 
not applicable to the Utah 
Board Ellis v. Utah Sta te 
(57 P 2 d 882 (Utah Ct App 
D e l i b e r a t i o n s . 
Public Service Commission's del iberat ions 
are not required to be open to the public when 
they are part of the "decision mak ing" or judi-
cial phase of the commission's work. Common 
Cause of Utah v. Utah Pub Serv. Comm'n. 598 
P 2 d 1312 (19791 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
U t a h U w Rev iew. — Common Cause v 
Utah Public Service Commission — The Appli-
cability of Open-Meeting legis la t ion to Quasi-
Judicial Bodies. 1980 UUih L. Rev. 829. 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum 
present, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the 
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body 
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall not apply to chance 
meetings "Convening," as used in this subsection, means the calling of a 
meeting of a public body by a person or persons authorized to do so for the 
express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that 
public body has jurisdiction. 
(21 "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or 
legislative body of the state or its political subdivisions which consists of 
two or more persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or 
in part by tax revenue and which is vested with the authority to make 
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public body" does not include 
any political party, group, or caucus nor any conference committee, rules 
or sifting committee of the legislature. 
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public 
body, unless otherwise defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not 
include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action, 
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected 
officials have jurisdiction. 
His to ry : C. 1953. 52-4-2. e n a c t e d by I~ 
1977, ch . 180. $ 2; 1981, ch . 191. 5 1; 1987, 
ch . 86. 5 1. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . - The 1987 amend-
ment. eflecti\e March lb\ 1987. subst i tuted 
chap te r ' for "act"' in the introductory lan-
guage; substituted "in person" for "corporal" in 
Subsection (J), and in the second sentence of 
Subsection (2> substi tuted "nor any conference 
committee, rules or sifting committee" for "or 
rules or sifting committees " 
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52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed pursuant to Sections 
52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-3, e n a c t e d by L. C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Violations, suit to 
1977, ch . 180, 5 3. void final action, § 52-4-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Publ ic S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n . regulat ions, contracts, or appointment* should 
Public Service Commission meet ings should be announced or issued in a meet ing open to 
be open to public dur ing commission's "infor- the public. Common Cause of Utah v. Utah 
mation ob t a in ing ' phase, but not dur ing "dcci- pu |> Serv. Comm'n. 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah 
sion mak ing" or judicial phase; any final and 1979). 
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules. 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — Busi-
ness — Reasons for meeting recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
members of the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is 
given pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed 
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under Section 52-4-5; pro-
vided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment 
shall be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for holding a 
closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such 
a meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of 
the meeting. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be 
closed to the public. 
History': C. 1953, 52-4-4, e n a c t e d by L. 
1977, c h . 180. ft 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Publ ic S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n . regulat ions, contracts, or appointments should 
Public Service Commission meetings should be announced or issued in a meeting open t<» 
be open to public dur ing commission's "infor- the public. Common Cause of Utah v Utah 
mation obta ining" phase, but not dur ing "deci- pu»>. Serv. Comm'n. 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah 
sion mak ing" or judicial phase; any final and 1 *J79). 
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules. 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings 
and social meetings excluded — Disruption of 
meetings. 
( D A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the 
following purposes: 
(a) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or 
mental health of an individual; 
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective bargaining, litigation, or 
purchase of real property; 
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(c) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel or devices; 
and 
(d) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal miscon-
duct. 
(2> This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting. 
No chance meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully 
disrupts a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compro-
mised. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-5. enacted by I>. 
1977. ch. 180. 5 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.I~R. Construction and application of meeting requirement of Sunnhine Act, 82 
exemptions, under 5 USCS § f>.r>'2b«c>. to open A L R Fed 465. 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in 
advance over the course of a year shall give public notice at least once each 
year of its annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. The public 
notice shall specify the date, time, and place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, 
each public body shall give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda, 
date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if 
no such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation 
within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media 
correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public 
body to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or 
urgent nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) may be disre-
garded and the best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a 
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its 
members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-6, enacted by I~ Cross-References. — Closed meeting held 
1977. ch. 180, 5 6; 1978. ch. 17. 5 1. upon vote at open meeting. 8 52-4-4. 
Violations, suit to void final action. I 52-4-8. 
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings — Public records — Re-
cording of meetings. 
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings. Such minutes shall 
include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(hi the names of members present and absent; 
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(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, a 
record, by individual member, of votes taken; 
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and the substance in bn 
their testimony; 
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered in 
minutes. 
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed meetings. Such minutes .-
include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) the names of all others present except where such disclosure w. 
infringe on the confidence necessary to fulfill the original purpos* 
closing the meeting. 
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be available within a rea 
able time after the meeting. 
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be recorded by any perso. 
attendance; provided, the recording does not interfere with the conduct ot 
meeting. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-7, ertneted by L. 
1977. ch. 180. I 7; 1978. ch. 17, 5 2. 
52-4-8. Suit to void final action — Limitation — Exc< 
tions. 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and 52-4-6 is void 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be < 
menced within 90 days after the action except that with respect to any t 
action concerning the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of indel 
ness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the action. 
History: C. 1953. 52-4-8. enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, i 8; 1978. ch. 17. ft 3. 
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel conij 
ance. 
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the state shall enforce 
chapter. 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may commence suit 
court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violat 
of this chapter or to determine its applicability to discussions or decisions 
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and court COM 
a successful plaintiff. 
History: C. 1953. 52-4-9. enacted by I„ 
1977, ch. 180. i 9. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counter- claim on ground that opposing party or hi* at-
claim. Recoupment, and Setoff §5 4, 9, 13, 15, tomey is engaged in unauthorized practice of 
35, 56, 57, 68. 73, 87, 101, 117, 139, 149. 151, law, 7 A.LR.4th 1146. 
155, 156; 20 Am Jur. 2d Courts § 169, 59 Am. Necessity and permiaaibility of ralaing daim 
Jur. 2d Parties 5 188 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d for abuae of process by reply or counterclaim in 
Pleading 5§ 182 to 186. aame proceeding in which abuae occurred — 
C.J.S. — 21 CJS. Courts J 66; 50 CJ.S. atat* esses, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115. 
Judgments 5 684; 67A CJ.S Parties $5 88 to Who ii an "opposing party" against whom a 
110; 71 C.J S Pleading §5 167 to 176; 80 CJ.S. counterclaim can be filed under Federal Civil 
Setoff and Counterclaim JS 1 et seq., 13, 27, Procedure Rule 13(a) or (b), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 815. 
36, 54. Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
A.L.R. — Bank's right to apply or set off 13(b) of Federal Rulea of Civil Procedure with 
deposit against debt of depositor not due at jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) aa 
time of his death. 7 A L.R3d 908. waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388. 
Proceeding for summary judgment as af- Effect of filing as separate federal action 
fected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 claim that would be compulsory counterclaim 
A L R 3d 1361 in pending federal action, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 240. 
Presentation of claim to executor or adminis* Key Numbers. — Courts «• 189(6'/i); Judg-
trator as prerequisite of its availability as ment«- 622(2); Parties •- 49 to 56; Pleading • -
counterclaim or setoff. 36 A L R 3d 693. 145, 149; Set-off and Counterclaim •- 1 et seq., 
Right of party-litigant to defend or counter- 3, 29(1), 40, 42J/j, 48 et seq., 59. 
Rule 14. Third-party practice. 
(a) When de fendan t may br ing in third party. At any time after com-
mencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against 
him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he 
files the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his 
original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all 
parties to the action. The person served with the summons and third-party 
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his de-
fenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his coun-
terclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other 
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may 
assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to 
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim 
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff. The 
plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim 
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon 
Bhall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and 
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed 
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-
party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may br ing in third party. When a counterclaim is 
asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under 
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is Bimilar to 
Rule 14(a) and (b), FRCP. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appellate jurisdiction. 
A ii * • • J ^- The final judgment rule, RCiv.P. 54(b), ap-Appellate jurisdiction. .. , ,, • , , * , \ Jf^. _/ , , , , , plies when the trial court orders a separate Third party by defendant : i r.i. i • i • i • P J t n a ' °* t n e c'a»m, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
TT »r0UI? *' »• . II i third-party claim, and failure to have the case 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. _,:r. J c i i. .«. . i _. i : i 
p - j . certified as final by the trial court, leaving is-
sues and parties before that court, will deprive 
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the appellate court of jurisdiction over an ap- Untimely motion to allow counterclaim, 
peal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
(Utah 1991). denying motions to allow a counterclaim and to 
Third party by defendant ^m« j " **** P*?v defendants which wert 
filed 13 months after an answer to the com-
~Grounds. plaint was filed and two weeks before the 
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor im- ^h^uled ^ j
 d a U ) | where reasons for the im-
pleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the de-
 t i m e l y m o t i o n w e r e i n a d e q U aU and where the 
fendant in the Initial action does so not on the
 rtie8 f a i l e d ^ d e m o r v f l t r a U ^ t h e ^MTVI 
^ °
u n d
. £ a t . * !Plalm ^ r ™ ] " . ^ e x l l U denial of the motions resulted in prejudice, 
against the thir^party defendant, but on the ^
 v Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App 
ground that the third-party defendant ^nay be iggV) 
liable" to the defendant in the principal action. 
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 
1344 (Utah 1984). 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parties or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
Q 188 et seq. A.L.R.4th 338. 
CJ.S. — 67 CJ.S. Parties 55 72 to 84. Key Numbers. — Parties *=• 49 to 56. 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once aa a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days afler service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) A m e n d m e n t s to conform to the evidence . When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in a\\ respects a& if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 15, FRCP. 
Addendum A. 17 
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Uile 25. Substitution of parties. 
a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court 
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution 
may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the 
deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on 
the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the 
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death 
is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the 
death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or 
more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be 
enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the sur-
viving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested 
upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the 
surviving parties. 
b) Incompetency . If a party becomes incompetent, the court upon motion 
rved as provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule may allow the action to be 
ntinued by or against his representative. 
c) Transfer of interest In case of any transfer of interest, the action may 
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion 
tcts the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the 
lion or joined with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as 
•vided in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
d) Publ ic officers; death or separation from office. When a public 
icer is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or other-
-e ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or 
iinst his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it is 
; isfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so contin-
:ig and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule may be made 
ien it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer 
>pts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his prede-
sor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless 
pressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the applica-
•n therefor and accorded an opportunity to object. 
ompUer's Notes. — This rule is subetan-
!y similar to Rule 25, FRCP. 
« rose-References. — Amended and supple-
-lal pleadingB, U.R.C.P. 15. 
laima for relief. U.R.C.P. 8*a). 
roas demands not affected by death, 
••: C.P. 13(i). 
^•positions, use following substitution of 
lies, U.R.CP 32(a). 
udgment against party dying afler verdict 
iedsion, payment of, 9 78-22-1.1. 
ANALYSIS 
ah. 
\etion against estate. 
. ailure to move to substitute. 
nsfer of interest, 
nveyance by defendant. 
nth. 
(Uon against estate. 
• here widow sought to continue separate 
nenance action against deceased hua-
Judgment may be rendered after death of 
party, U.R.C.P. 58A(e). 
Limitation of actions, effect of death, 69 78-
12-37, 78-12-38 
Parties plaintiff and defendant; capacity, 
U.R.C.P. 17. 
Permissive joinder of parties, U.R.C.P. 20. 
Substitution of parties on appeal, Rule 38, 
Utah R. App. P. 
Time, U.R.C.P. 6. 
band's estate, existence of her claim was 
ground for appointment of Utah representa-
tive, and she waa not entitled to have disinter-
ested person substituted as defendant even 
though husband died in smother state and left 
no property in Utah and his executrix in other 
state refused to appear. Allred v. Allred, 12 
Utah 2d 325, 366 P 2d 478 (1961). 
—Failure to move to substitute. 
Where a defendant died and his death was 
immediately noted upon the court record, but 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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plaintiff never moved for • substitution of par-
ties nor aaked for an enlargement of the 90-day 
period within which to seek substitution, it 
was not error for the trial court to dismiss the 
complaint. Connelly v. Ratfyen. 647 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1976). 
Transfer of interest. 
—Conveyance by defendant 
In quiet title action court did not lose juris-
COLLATERAL 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 
}J 225 et seq., 231 to 233. 
C.J.8. — 67 C.J.S. Parties 5 58 et aeq. 
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attor-
ney to confess judgment against assignee, 
guarantor, or other party obligating himself 
for performance of primary contract, 5 
A L.R 3d 426. 
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of 
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or 
next friend to sue for granting or vacation of, 
or to make a compromise or settlement in such 
suit. 6 A LR3d 681. 
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit 
against debt of depositor not due at time of his 
death, 7 A.LR.3d 908. 
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or 
legal obligation contemporaneously or subse-
quently Incurred shall be canceled by death of 
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R.3d 1427. 
Applicability, as affected by change in par-
ties, of statute permitting commencement of 
new action within specified time after failure 
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848. 
diction when defendant conveyed during pen-
dency of action; Subdivision (c) continues liti-
gation with same litigants to determinative 
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance 
pendente lite, resulting in series of endless 
suits. Briggs v. Hess. 122 Utah 559. 252 P 2d 
538 (1963). 
REFERENCES 
Cause of death, official death certificate as 
evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21 
A.L.RSd 418. 
Attorney's death prior to final adjudication 
or settlement of case as affecting compensation 
under contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d 
1375. 
Validity, in contract for installment sale of 
consumer goods, or commercial paper given in 
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as 
against assignee, defenses good against seller, 
39 A.L.R.3d 518. 
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent, 
priority and preference in appointment of, 65 
A.L.R.3d 991. 
Defamation action as surviving plaintiff's 
death, under statute not specifically covering 
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272. 
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party, 
filed under Rule 25(a)(1) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of 
party afler death, 105 A.LR. Fed. 816. 
Key Numbers. — Parties «=• 59. 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
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(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(2) Insu rance agreements . A party may obtain discovery of the exis-
tence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reim-
burse for payments made to batisfy the judgment. Information concerning 
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in 
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insur-
ance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement. 
(3) Trial p r epa ra t i on : Mater ials . Subject to the provisions of Subdivi-
sion (b><4> of this rule, a party may obtain discovery' of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pn sMons, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concern-
ing the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon 
request a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court 
order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in -elation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is 
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Trial p r epa ra t i on : Exper t s . Discovery of facta known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Sub-
division (bnl) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: 
<A> (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other 
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to 
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on 
uhich the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance 
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify 
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
(n) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by 
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such 
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an ex-
pert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not ex-
pected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) 
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
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impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4KA)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert. 
(c) Protec t ive o rders . Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and t iming of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementa t ion of responses . A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery Vith a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
( D A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
Bubject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 72 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(0 Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
-chedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
lor the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered 
>r amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference 
:o prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
.onference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
tg) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
ins address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
:hat he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
Knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) 
* onsistent with these ruled and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
viiscovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
lon is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
bjection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to 
it until it is signed. 
If a certification in made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
;ion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or 
;>oth, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount 
>f the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a rea-
sonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
iction or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
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within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitationfl as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided 
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in .vhich the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further 
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the 
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — Thia rule corresponds 
to Rule 26, FRCP. 
Croaa-Rcfcrencca. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, 8 78-21-3; U.RC.P. 43(a). 
Continuance to permit discovery, U.RC.P. 
68(f). 
Depositions upon oral examination, U.R C.P. 
30(c). 
Depositions, use in court proceedings, 
U.RC.P. 32. 
Depositions, when taken, U.R C P. 30(a). 
Discovery procedures, Rule 4-502, Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
Exclusion of deposition from evidence, 
U.RC.P. 32(b). 
Expert and other opinion testimony, U.R E 
701 to 706. 
Fee for filing notice «-f deposition concerning 
action in another stats, 5 21-1-5. 
Liability insurance, admissibility of, U.R.E 
411. 
Motions, evidence on, by depositions, 
U.RC.P. 43(b). 
Privileges, 55 78-24-8, 78-24-9; U.R.E 501 et 
seq. 
Summary judgment, discovery supporting or 
opposing motion for, U.R C.P. 56(e). 
Terminate or limit examination, motion to, 
URC.P. 30(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability of rale. 
Appellate review. 
—Denial of discovery request. 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Protective order. 
—Trade secrete. 
—Waiver 
Purpose of rule. 
Scope of discovery. 
—In general. 
Relevance. 
—Insurance agreements. 
—Official information privilege 
—Trial preparation. 
Adjuster's file. 
Discovery from state 
Eminent domain 
Otherwise discoverable records 
Subjective matters 
Testimony of witness 
Cited. 
Applicability of rule. 
The taking of depositions pursuant to the 
Utah Rulea of Civil Procedure is applicable in 
an action to remove a public official from office 
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
6. State v. Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12 
(1961). 
Appellate review. 
—Denial of discovery request 
When denial of a discovery request is deter-
mined on review to have been in error, the bur-
den of demonstrating that the erroneous denial 
was not prejudicial is upon the party resisting 
discovery. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted, 892 P.2d 
13 (Utah 1995). 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discover.' proceedings to re-
fuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed 
in depositions, demands for production of docu-
ments, and requests for admissions; however, 
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party 
muBt show that the response sought to be com-
pelled might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. 
&. Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 
(Utah 1984) 
Protective order. 
—Trade secret*. 
Materials that are the subject of a protective 
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automat-
ically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of 
the federal Freedom of Information Act be-
cause the determination of whether documents 
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to 
be made solely by applying the express exemp-
tion for trade secrets and confidential commer-
cial or financial information found in the ex-
emption iUelf. Anderson v. Department of 
Health & Human Servs , 907 F.2d 936 (10th 
Cir. 1990). 
—Waiver. 
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for pro-
tection with respect to documents alleged to be 
work product waives whatever right a defen-
dant may have been able to assert. Moreover, a 
defendant's failure to demonstrate any dili-
gence whatsoever in asserting the privilege is 
itnelf a waiver. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P 2d 164 
(Utah 1990). 
Purpose of rule. 
The purposes of discovery rules are to make 
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by 
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities, 
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery 
so that the parties and the court can determine 
the facts and resolve the issues as directly, 
Addendum A. 18 
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late on morning trial was commenced because 
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme 
Court a w n t of prohibition to prevent the hold 
mg of the trial on that day due to absence of 
defense witnesses the tnal court erred in 
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and 
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate 
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evi 
dence notwithstanding any ill advised irritat-
ing or contemptuous conduct from defense 
counsel during the action since the law prefers 
that a case be tried on its merits and the par 
ties litigant should not be made to suffer for 
the misconduct of their counsel McKean v 
Mountain View Mem Estates Inc 17 Utah 2d 
323 411 P 2 d 129 (1966) 
—Default entry necessary 
No default judgment may be entered under 
Subdivision ib (2) unless default has prevt 
ously been entered The entry of default is an 
essential predicate to any default judgment P 
& B Land Inc v Klungervik 751 P 2d 274 
(Utah Ct App 1988) 
—Failure to follow rule 
Rule 54(c)(2) and this rule prescribe the pro 
cedure to be followed b\ trial courts in entering 
judgments against defaulting parties and 
courts are not at hbert> to deviate from those 
rules just because one party is in default and is 
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the 
case Russell v Martell 681 P 2d 1193 (Utah 
1984* 
Judgment against defaulting part> must be 
reversed where plaintiffs claims for damages 
were not for surra certain and a hearing was 
not conducted by the trial court to ascertain 
the amount of damages to wh ch tht plaintiffs 
were entitled Russell v Martell 681 P 2d 
1193 (Utah 1984) 
The entrv of a default judgment b> a court 
with jurisdiction o\er the parties and the sub-
ject matter where there is no default in law or 
in fact is improper and voidable P & B Land 
Inc v Klungervik 751 P 2d 274 (Ltah Ct 
App 1988) 
—Hearing on merits 
No one has an inalienable or constitutional 
right to a judgment by default without a hear 
ing on the merits The courts in the interest of 
justice and fair play fa\or where possible a 
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on 
the merits of every case Heathman v rabian 
14 Utah 2d 60 377 P 2d 189 (1962) 
—Punita\e d a m a g e s 
Lower courts award of punitive damages 
without proof and upon default judgment was 
in and of itself justification for vacating judg 
ment Security Adjustment Bureau Inc v 
West, 20 Ltah 2d 292 437 P 2d 214 (1968) 
Not ice 
This rule provides that a party in default 
need not be given rotice o( the entry of default 
judgment Central Bank &. Trust C o v Jensen 
656 P 2 d 1009 ( l t a h 1982) 
Set t ing as ide d e f a u l t 
An entry of default may be set aside under 
this rule for good cauBe shown by the court 
once a judgment b> default has been entered 
however it may be set aside only in accordance 
with Rule 60(b) Calder Bros Co • Anderson, 
652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982) 
Once a default judgment has been entered, it 
can only be set aside In accordance with Rule 
60(b) Arnica Mut Ins Co v SchetUcr, 768 
P 2d 960 (Utah C t App 1989) 
—Collateral attack. 
Where affidavit for publication of summons 
contained some evidence upon which the order 
for publication of summons could reasonably 
be based, a default judgment against the defen-
dant could not be attacked collatarally, even if 
the evidence was Insufficient to persuade the 
judge or clerk of the neceeaary facta Bowen v 
Olson 122 Utah 66, 246 P 2d 602 (1952) 
—Direct attack 
An action brought to vacate a default judg* 
ment on ground that service of summons by 
publication was obtained by fraud is a direct 
and not a collateral attack Bowen v Olson, 
122 Utah 66 246 P 2d 602 (1952) 
—Discretion of c o u r t 
A tnal court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a 
motion to set a default judgment aside Board 
of Educ v Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P 2d 806 
(1963) 
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on throe occa-
sions before three different judges and his mo-
tions were denied in the first two proceedings, 
the third judge was barred by the law of the 
case from overruling the previous orders 
Maacaro v Davis 741 P 2d 938 (Utah 1967) 
—Grounds 
Excusable n e g l e c t 
A default certificate may be set aside upon 
grounds of excusable neglect Heathman v 
Fabian 14 Utah 2d 60 377 P 2d 189 (1962) 
While reliance on an attorney's assurances 
that ones rights are being protected could, in 
the appropriate circumstances be seen as ex 
cusable neglect tnal court properly refused to 
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to 
establish that she was so represented Miller v 
Brocksmith 825 P 2d 690 (Utah Ct App 
1992) 
—Judicial attitude 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment unless 
to do so would result in substantia! prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party Westinghouse 
Elec Supply Co v Paul W Larsen Contractor, 
544 P 2d 876 (Utah 1975) 
—Movant's duty 
Party who seeks to have a default judgment 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible ment to justify a trial on 
that issue Downey State Bank v Major 
Blakeney Corp 545 P 2d 507 (Utah 1976) 
—Setting aside proper 
V»here plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should hsve been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
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with our declared policy that in case of uncer 
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trie! on the merits Locke \ Peterson 3 
Utah 2d 415 285 P 2d 1111 (1955) 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
ware properly eet aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued Fibreboard 
Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P 2 d 1005 (1970) 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
data, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion daye between time objection was filed 
and trial date objection was never heard re 
fusal to set aside default judgment enured 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Ham 
mon 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977) 
Time for appea l 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg 
ment, rather than from the date of judgment 
Buckner v Main Realty & Ins Co 4 Utah 2d 
124 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)) 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965) 
J P W Enters , Inc v Naef 604 P 2d 486 
(Utah 1979) KaU v Pierce 732 P 2d 92 (Utah 
1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorne> s 
mistake as to time or place of appearance 
tnal or filing of necessary papers 21 A L R 3d 
1255 
Failure to give notice of application for de 
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom 28 A L R 3d 1383 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference 55 A L R 3d 303 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 55 A L R Fed 190 
Key Numbers — Judgment ** 92 to 134 
Br lgham Young U w R e v i e w — Reason 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra 
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937 
A m J u r 2d — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
5 265 et seq 
CJA — 4 9 C . J S Judgments 55 187 to 218 
A L R . — Necessity of takina proof aa to ha 
bility against defsulting defendant 8 A L R 3d 
1070 
Appealability of order setting aside or refus-
ing to set aside default judgment 8 A L R 3d 
1272 
Defaulting defendants right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam 
ages, 15 A L R 3d 586 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For c la imant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
croaa claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully ad judica ted on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro 
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub 
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stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedingB in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken OT discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler'* Notes. — This rale is similar to CrossRcferences. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56. FRCP. 99 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligenoe. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
-Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
-Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written statement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit 
—Contents. 
Specific facta are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Out-
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facta showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1986). 
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that con-
tained opinion, legal conclusions, and facta not 
supported by adequate foundstion but portions 
of which complied with Subdivision (e), be-
cause the objectionable statements did nothing 
more than supplement the arguments made in 
plaintiffs memorandum, did not prejudice de-
fendants. Brosdwster v. Old Republic Sur., 854 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
—Corporation. 
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a 
corporation, it ia generally considered to be the 
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the 
personal knowledge of an agent of the corpora-
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding 
the facts to which he has sworn will generally 
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 
"means and sources" of his information should 
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Asa'n v. 
Watts, 737 P 2d 154 (Utah 1987). 
—Experts. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert 
to state his opinion concerning the ultimate 
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must 
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the 
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is suffi-
cient if it articulates the facts upon which the 
opinion was based and if the facts were of the 
Hype usually relied upon by experta in the 
field." Oaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Because the sole purpose underlying Utah R. 
Evid. 705 ia to obviate the need to use hypo-
thetical questions to elicit expert opinion, the 
rule's drafters did not intend to exempt expert 
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment 
from the requirement in Subdivision (e) of this 
rule that affidavits set forth specific facta 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial; affi-
davits must include not only the expert's opin-
ion, but also the specific facta that logically 
support the expert's conclusion. Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
Party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit 
that contradicts his deposition to create an is-
sue of fact on a motion for summary judgment 
unless there is some substantial likelihood 
that the deposition testimony was in error or 
the party-deponent is able to state in his affi-
davit an adequate explanation for the contra-
dictory answer in his deposition. Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State. 
798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Where a defendants motion for summary 
judgment is based solely on his pleadings and 
is not made and supported by affidavits, as pro-
vided in Subdivision (c), plaintiff, pursuant to 
Subdivision (e), may rest on the allegations in 
his pleadingB. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 
542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
Fact that party opposed to the motion for 
summary judgment fails to submit documents 
in opposition does not preclude the denial of 
the motion; where the party opposed submits 
no documents in opposition, the moving party 
may be granted summary judgment only if ap-
propriate, that ia, he is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1982). 
When a party opposes a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment and fails to file 
any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials allowed by Subdivision (e), the trial 
court may properly conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the 
movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Franklin Fin. v. 
New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983); Cowen 8c Co. v. Atlaa Stock Tranaf. Co., 
695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State 
Farm Fire & Caa. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
1987). 
Summary judgment need not be affirmed 
merely because party opposing summary judg-
ment did not file affidavits in order to avoid 
judgment against him Mountain States Tel. St 
Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
When read in light of Subdivision (b), it is 
clear that the Subdivision (e) requirement that 
a party opposing the summary judgment mo-
tion file counter-affidavits applies only when 
the moving party haa elected to and has filed 
affidavits in support of the motion. If the mov-
ing party chooses not to or simply fails to file 
affidavits, Subdivision (e) is inapplicable. Gadd 
v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
filed and supported by an affidavit, the party 
opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to 
respond with affidavits or other materials al-
lowed by Subdivision (e). D & L Supply v. 
Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thayne v. 
Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 
1994). 
